

Theology vol 104.

A

# VINDICATION OF THE BISHOP OF LONDON'S SECOND PASTORAL LETTER.

IN  
ANSWER to a late PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED,

A Second ADDRESS to the Inhabitants  
of the Two Great Cities of *London*  
and *Westminster*.

---

*Addressed to the said Author by an Inhabitant  
of one of those Great Cities, Author of the  
two first Vindications, &c.*

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*God gave Man with his very Being a Law of Uprightness, but  
they, as the wise Man says, found out many Inventions;  
by which they more or less destroy'd this Law of Uprightness.  
Second Address, Pag. 39.*

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A



# A VINDICATION of the Bishop of London's Second Pastoral Letter.

S I R,

**I**F you have perused the *Title-Page*, you must acknowledge, that I am a Friend to *Truth* wheresoever I find it; since I have taken a Sentence from the Middle of your Work, and placed it, by way of Approbation, in the *Front* of my own: God, you say \*, gave *Man* with his *very Being* a *Law of Uprightness*; but they, as the *Wise Man* says, found out many Inventions; by which they, more or less, destroyed this *Law of Uprightness*. The Destruction, as you grant, is universal; the Difference only in the Degrees; which is as much as the Nature of our Argument demands. For, if this Law, in its first and full Perfection, was only adequate to the Measure of human Duty; as far as it is destroyed, it must of Necessity fall short of that Measure, and consequently of its original Sufficiency. Instead therefore of shewing any Dislike to what the *Bishop* says on this Head, in common Decency to your own Character, as a consistent Writer; and as one, who had at least so much Power over his own Belief, as to believe *himself*; I expected to

B have

\* Addr. p. 39.

have seen you falling in with his *Lordship*, whenever he spoke to the same purpose, *viz.* "That "tho' a Law of *Uprightness* was given, yet, by "the Inventions of succeeding Generations, this "Law was so destroyed, that Mankind could not "make use of it, to the same high Purposes for "which it was intended, and sufficient, when "known in its *full Perfection*." A Measure may be made *mathematically* equal to any given Line; but if the least Part, of what is now supposed equal, is destroyed, an Inequality of one to the other must arise, in proportion to the Part so taken away.

Having now paid my Civilities to you, for the Pleasure you have given me, in offering this *Truth* to my Consideration, I find myself obliged to change the Prospect; and am forced to follow you through long and intricate Deviations from it, in much *design'd* Perplexity and Confusion. Your Management, in this Affair, so much resembles the wicked Policy of *Medea*, when she fled, described in some Lines cited by *Tully*\*, that I must insert them:

[dit,

*Puerum interea obtruncat, membraq; articulatim divi-*  
*Perque Agros passim dispergit corpus: id ea gratia,*  
*Ut dum nati dissipatos Artus captaret Parens,*  
*Ipsa interea effugeret.*

If you will make the least Allowance for the *Allusion*, there cannot be a more lively Description of the barbarous Usage you have given this *Pastoral Letter*; when, without any Regard to the *Connection*, the *Beauty*, and the *Harmony* of the whole Piece, you artfully scatter the *disjointed* Parts of it, throughout your Address, in such a manner, as may best serve to raise Confusion, to darken

\* De Nat. Deor. l. 3. c. 26.

darken, and thereby secure your Retreat. This *Artifice* of yours making it impossible to follow you, in the irregular Disposition of your Objections, without following you in your Confusion too; I shall, all along, observe the Method of the *Pastoral Letter*, and reduce your Arguments into regular and distinct Views, under those several Heads, to whose Doctrine you oppose them. And

To begin with your first Objection, made to what his *Lordship* assigns, as the Occasion of this *Pastoral Letter*, it runs thus: “*Tho’ this Writer says, that this Pastoral Letter is occasioned by some late Writings, in which it is asserted, That REASON is a sufficient Guide in Matters of Religion, without the Help of REVELATION;*” yet since Men may believe Reason to have been a sufficient Guide without Revelation, when there was no Revelation to help it out; he ought to have been more particular in what he makes the Foundation of this Letter, and not endeavour to lead his Reader into a Mistake by so general a Charge. What you here say, had been a reasonable Objection, supposing, either that the Writings, which occasioned this *Pastoral Letter*, had been unknown; or that there had been no subsequent Treatise, in which the Terms of the general *Question* had been particularly, tho’ incidentally, explain’d, and their precise Meanings so determin’d, as to make it impossible for any one to mistake, unless thro’ Prejudice or Obsturacy. It is a hard Case, that if Men write by the strict Rules of *Art*, then they are downright *Pedants*; if in an *easy* and *familiar* way, then they must suffer as leading Men into Mistake. But since nothing can at present please, but the

† Addr. p. 2, 3.

*scholaſtick Form*, I shall diſtinctly ſtate the *Terms*, according to the ordinary Use of them, as they occur in this *Paſtoral Letter*. And,

*First*, By *Reason* is intended mere *Human Reason*, abſtracted from, and contradiſtinguished to the Knowledge, or Use of thoſe Writings, which we call *Revelation*.

Thus in the firſt general *Head*, viz. \* *Of the true and proper Use of Reason with regard to Revelation*; *Reason* is precisely conſider'd in this Sense, not only as diſtinct from *Revelation*, but as acting the Part of a *Judge*, in examining the Evidences and Proofs by which *Revelation* would eſtabliſh herſelf; and under the ſecond *Head*, viz. † *Reason of itſelf is an insufficient Guide in Matters of Religion*; *Reason* always ſignifies the natural Powers of that Faculty only, whereby we are ſuperior to the *Brute Creation*, as it stands alone, and is opposed to the *Discoveries of Revelation*. *Reason*, taken in this determin'd Sense, his *Lordſhip* very juſtly denies to be a ſufficient Guide in Matters of Religion.

Now by *Religion*, it is maniſt, that the *true Religion* muſt be intended, which can be but *one*; and that one *true Religion*, in the *Biſhop's Judgment*, is *Christianity*. *Truth* can be but *one*, and ſimple, as coresponding to the *Nature of Things*; *Falſhood* may be infinite and various, as having no *unchangeable Object*. Let us now ſee, what is deſigned by “*a ſufficient Guide in Matters of Religion*.” And,

*First*, Let it be obſerved, that here is no *uncharitable Condemnation* of all thoſe, who have had no other *Light* than their natural *Reason*. For in reference to these Men, his *Lordſhip* is, more than once, very clear; eſpecially, where

\* *Paſt. Lett. p. 4.*

† *Ibid. p. 7.*

where he says, \* " As to the Heathens, though  
 " the Light of Reason is but dim, yet they who  
 " have no other Light to walk by, and who  
 " honestly make use of that, as the only Guide  
 " God has given them, cannot fail to be merci-  
 " fully dealt with by infinite Justice and Good-  
 " ness. This is the Foundation of St. Paul's  
 " Reasoning, upon the State of the Gentile  
 " World," &c.

Secondly, To be affirmatively a sufficient Guide, must import a Power of conveying, if not an actual Communication of, a clear, full, and uniform Scheme of the Knowledge of all such Truths and Duties, as are necessary to compleat and perfect Religion, or which really make it the *one true Religion*; which is the lowest Sense in which a Guide can be called sufficient for the Purposes here mention'd. For the Question being, whether Reason is sufficient without Revelation, and this Sufficiency being considered *relatively*, or as a *Means to an End*, in more explicit Terms it will stand thus: Whether Reason ever did, or can, unassisted by Revelation, establish as *just* and *true* Notions of God, and of all the Relations which he bears to us, and we to him, as those are which the Gospel has revealed?

This his *Lordship* thinks himself obliged to deny, from that Knowledge which we have both of the *Divine* and *Human Conduct*.

*First*, In Regard to the *Divine Conduct*; because, in ascribing such a Sufficiency to Reason, Men do secretly undermine the *Necessity* of Revelation: But, as his *Lordship* observes, † "To suppose that God makes a Revelation which is  
 " Need-

\* Past. Lett. p. 46.

† Past. Lett. p. 2.

" *Nædless*, is a direct Impeachment of his *Wis-*  
 " *dom.*" Now the Truth and Authority of the  
*Christian Revelation* are so demonstratively set  
 before us in *one View*, and in their *united*  
 Strength, in the first *Pastoral Letter*, as to re-  
 move, not only every Occasion of Doubt and  
 Perplexity from the impartial *Reader*; but to  
 leave even you, and yours, more Matter for *De-*  
*spair* than *Cavil*. Had there been any Room for  
 such an Attempt, your proper Method was to  
*set aside* those Evidences which the *Bishop* there  
 produced. Since if it be true, as has been most  
 certainly proved, that God did make the *Gospel*  
*Revelation*, the Consequence is unavoidable, that  
 there were *wise Reasons* for it. And since the  
 whole Import of it, is to convey the Knowledge,  
 and the Means of Duty to *Mankind*, we must  
 conclude, that Mankind could not have arrived  
 at this Knowledge, and those Means of Duty,  
 by any Application of their own *natural Facul-*  
*ties*. Unless therefore *this single Argument* could  
 be removed, it is in vain to talk of the Suffi-  
 ciency of Human Reason, in this Instance, when  
 God himself has by his *own Act*, and that attest-  
 ed by the highest Degrees of Evidence, declared  
 it to be insufficient.

This first Reason, which the *Bishop* has judi-  
 ciously taken from the Knowledge and Obser-  
 vation of the *Divine Conduct*, will remain un-  
 answerable, as long as the Evidences of our Re-  
 ligion remain true; which must be to all Eter-  
 nity, since the Nature of *past Facts* cannot alter.  
 But his *Lordship* proceeds,

*Secondly*, To oppose this pretended Sufficiency  
 of Reason, from the Knowledge and Observati-  
 on

on of *human Conduct*. But the Truth of this, and of some other Questions, which naturally depend upon it, or fall in with it, taking up the greatest Part of your present Quarrel to this *Pastoral Letter*, I shall regularly go through every Head of it, in the same Order the *Bishop* has prescribed; and as I before proposed, reduce your scattered Objections to their proper Stations, and there consider their real Weight and Merit. And,

*First, \* Of the true and proper Use of Reason, with regard to Revelation.* Here the *Bishop* says, " Those among us who have laboured of late " Years to set up Reason against Revelation, " would make it pass for an establish'd Truth, " that if you will embrace Revelation, you must " of Course quit your Reason; which, were it " true, would doubtless be a strong Prejudice " against Revelation. But so far is this from " being true, that it is universally acknowledg- " ed that Revelation it self is to stand or " fall by the Test of Reason; or, in other " Words, according as Reason finds the Evi- " dences of it coming from God, to be, or not " to be sufficient and conclusive; and the Mat- " ter of it to contradict, or not contradict " the Natural Notions which Reason gives " us of the Being and Attributes of God, and " of the essential Differences between Good " and Evil." Your Objections to this are as follows; + *Is not this owning Reason to be the sole independent Rule?* First, *If our Duty to each other consist in not only doing no Harm, but all possible Good to one another; and Reason teaches us what is Good or Evil, and the essential Differences between them,*

\* Past. Lett. p. 4.      + Addr. p. 48.

them; is not Reason here the sole Rule? Can Revelation command us to do, or avoid doing any Thing which Reason does not command or forbid? Secondly, If it is from Reason we must know that there is a God, and what he is, or what are his Attributes; must not all Revelation whatever, even in this Writer's Opinion, be rejected, that should command or forbid any Thing whatever, that is inconsistent with those natural Notions which Reason gives us of the Being and Attributes of God?

What you here assume of Reasons being the sole independent Rule, does by no means follow, from any Thing laid down by the Bishop, in that unlimited and absolute Sense, in which you use the Words, *sole* and *independent*. Reason is certainly the *first*, and as far as its proper Sphere of Action extends in the present Case, it is the *sole*, nay, to please you, let it be thus far the *independent* Rule. To your *first* Query therefore, I reply, that Reason, as far as it can demonstrate the essential Differences between Good and Evil, and give suitable Directions for the proper use of this Knowledge, in “not only doing no Harm, but all possible Good to one another;” Reason, I say, where there is no Revelation of the Divine Will made to Men, may thus far be very justly look'd on as the *sole* Rule. But I am not able to discern, by what Methods of *Logical Discourse* you can, upon this Concession, establish your next Assertion, which you propose as a necessary Deduction from it: *viz.* “That Revelation can “not command us to do, or avoid doing any “Thing which Reason does not command or “forbid.” For,

May not Reason, though fallible and limited, be the most proper, and the best Rule of Action, where no more certain, or more extended

tended Means of Duty are to be acquired ; and may not the same Reason, on the Acknowledgment of a *Divine Revelation*, as a *superior infallible Guide* in all Matters of Doctrine and Practice, act as a social *concurrent Rule* of Duty, in all Cases where her natural Powers have discovered the essential Differences of Things ; and as an *inferior subordinate Rule*, where Revelation has made new Discoveries, or where, as in *multiplied Instances*, it has changed Probabilities into Certainties, and Problems into Demonstrations ? So that if you mean by Reason, as his *Lordship* does, the natural Strength of Human Understanding ; and by that which Reason does command or forbid, such Terms of Duty, as its unassisted Powers could establish ; undoubtedly there will be no manner of Inconsistency in affirming, that Revelation may command or forbid that, which Reason thus considered, could not discover, and consequently not propose to our Reception.

I think we have very little Busines with the Inference you make from the Grounds of your second Question, “ That all Revelation what-  
“ ever, even in this Writer’s Opinion, must be  
“ rejected, that should command or forbid any  
“ Thing whatever, that is *inconsistent* with  
“ those natural Notions which Reason gives of  
“ the Being and Attributes of God.” For the natural Notions which Reason gives being true, both in *themselves*, and by *Supposition*, whatever is inconsistent with these Notions must be false ; and from the Nature of the Subject, include such Inconsistencies, as must amount to Contradictions ; by which Term the *Bishop*, as having no Occasion for *Artifice* or *Ambiguity*, chose to express his own Ideas ; and which, you, as more agreeable to your gentle cautious Nature, have

endeavour'd to soften into *inconsistent*, but without the least real Advantage to your Cause, since it must be finally resolved into the same Meaning.

Having thus considered what you call your Premises, I shall go on to review your main Strength.

This being premised, you say, we will see whether this Writer, in \* endeavouring to prove, that reasonable Creatures are bound to believe that to be the Will of God, in which they can see neither Wisdom or Expedience, observes his own Rule in examining this Assertion by the Test of Reason; and shews it does not contradict the natural Notions we have of the Being and Attributes of God, and of the essential Differences of Good and Evil. This he ought to have attempted, since it seems at first sight most certain, that God is no arbitrary Being, or can command for commanding's sake, Things which shew neither Wisdom or Expedience. If infinite Wisdom and Goodness are the essential Attributes of the Deity, must they not govern all his Actions? And must not his Laws (the chief Subjects wherein his Wisdom and Goodness display themselves) have, like his Works, both these Attributes impressed on them? To deny this, is it not to deny he is either wise or good; much less infinitely wise or good? Are we not certain from his Wisdom, he can't be mistaken in the Nature of the Things he commands; or command useless and needless Things; such as neither tend to his own, or Creatures Good? And if such Commands are inconsistent with his Wisdom, they must certainly be so with his Goodness; especially, if severe Penalties are annexed to the not observing them.

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\* Addr. p. 49.

\* This Writer, you continue on, without taking the least Notice of these obvious Objections, says; “ † When Reason, upon an impartial Examination, finds the Evidences to be full and sufficient, it pronounces that the Revelation ought to be received, and as a necessary Consequence thereof directs us to give up our selves to the Guidance of it. But here Reason stops; not as set aside by Revelation, but as taking Revelation for its Guide, and not thinking it self at Liberty to call in Question the *Wisdom* and *Expedience* of any Part, after it is satisfied that the Whole comes from God.” But he does not tell us, how we can be satisfied the whole comes from God, if it teaches such Things as will not bear the Test of Reason; or is inconsistent with the natural Notions Reason gives of the Being and Attributes of God, and the essential Difference between Good and Evil.

You see I have made a larger *Transcript* than is usual, but I hope the Length of it will be excused, because it takes in those Passages of the *Pastoral Letter* you object to, as well as your own Objections; which will be easily satisfied by considering, First,

That though the *Bishop* does say, “ That Reason does not think it self at Liberty to call in Question the *Wisdom* and *Expedience* of any Part, after it is satisfied that the Whole comes from God;” (and as follows, and what will make your Quotation full and complete) “ any more than to object against it, as containing some Things, the *Manner*, *End* and *Design* of which it cannot fully comprehend;”

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yet

\* Addr. p. 50.    † Past. Lett. p. 4, 5.    || Past. Lett. p. 5.

yet he is not, for this Assertion, to be *justly* tax'd with the most minute Deviation from his own Rule. For you must know, that the Province his *Lordship* assigns to Reason in this Affair, is a previous Examination of the *external* Evidences, by such Methods of Trial, as the *Nature* of those Evidences do require, and is necessarily subject to; and an Examination of the *internal* Evidences, by comparing them with its own natural Notions, and a Power of rejecting whatever does contradict them. But,

Where will you find any one, who does not see a wide Difference between the Ideas he has of a Proposition, whose *Wisdom* or *Expedience* he does not comprehend; and of another, whose Contents do manifestly contradict the establish'd Maxims of Natural Reason? In this latter Case, he has a clear and distinct Perception of that Disagreement and Inconsistency, wherein the Nature of *Falshood* does properly consist; and therefore he can never admit it as true, without giving up the *only* Means we have of Certainty, and utterly subverting the Foundation of all Truth. For if all the Certainty we can obtain, results from the known Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas, as far as they *really* correspond, and are conform'd to the essential Nature of Things, and the Nature of Things is eternal and invariable; it is impossible to conceive Men at any Time under the least Shew of an Obligation to admit as true, any Position that is contradictory to *Certainty* thus obtain'd. The real Cause then of our rejecting what is thus contradictory, being grounded in that clear and open Perception we have of its *Falshood*: This Cause, I say, can never have any *Place*, and consequently ought not to have any *Influence* in those Cases, where we do not dis-

discover the least Repugnancy to Truth, but only are not able to *see* the *Wisdom* or Expedience, or fully to comprehend the *Manner*, *End* and *Design* of the Thing proposed. For,

As we are not able to take Arguments, for the Excellency or Usefulness of it, from internal Evidences arising from the *Nature* of the Thing itself, that being beyond our Discoveries; so, for the very same Reason, we can never justly conclude, that it is not excellent or not useful. Unless then we are obliged to pronounce the same Judgment, and act in the same manner, where we do clearly see an *undeniable* Motive to judge, and a *necessary* Cause of Action; and where we cannot discern *any such* Motive, or Cause, you must confess a wide and real Difference in these Cases, and consequently sufficient Grounds for a manifest *Distinction*, and different Measures of Judgment and Demeanour.

If being certain then from the *Nature* of *Truth* thus consider'd, 1<sup>st</sup>, That Contradictions to our natural Notions are to be rejected, as manifest Falshoods. 2<sup>dly</sup>, That Propositions, of whose Truth or Falshood, Excellency or Usefulness, we have no Certainty, either *immediately* by Intuition, or *mediately* by the Assistance of Reason and Inference, cannot be either justly received as *true*, or rejected as *false*. I shall go on, upon this bottom, to examine, how far the *Divine* Interposition can make the one, or the other, become the *reasonable* Objects of human Faith and Obedience.

Now the Will of God, and the eternal Oracles of undefiled Reason being one and the same thing; it is *impossible* that they should ever interfere, much less contradict each other; so that without farther Enquiries we may be well assured,

red, that no Commands, of *this* Nature, can proceed from the Almighty Father of Light and Truth. But,

Since there are Truths, such as *necessary Self-existence, Eternity, &c.* or those of a lower Nature, in the Mathematical or material World, as the *Divisibility of Matter, the Asymptotes in Conick Sections, &c.* which are placed above our present Measure of Comprehension, and yet not rejected, merely on that Account, by any *wise* or *learned Man*; since there are, and must be, an Infinity of such Truths, which tho' above us, are open and unveil'd to the All-comprehending View of God, who perfectly knows their Fitness and Expedience to the Production of *proper* Ends; there can be no sufficient Reason assigned, why God may not reveal one, or more, of these Truths to Mankind; or why our Reception of them, and Submission to them, should not prove of great *Value*, and, from thence, of great *Use* to us, in his Sight.

Neither is there any thing in all this, which, as you fear, does contradict \* the natural Notions we have of the Being and Attributes of God, and of the essential Differences of Good and Evil: for tho' we agree with you, † that God is no arbitrary Being, or commands for commanding sake; yet we deny your Inference, viz. that he cannot command things, which shew neither Wisdom or Expedience; i. e. Things, whose Wisdom or Expedience we cannot discover by any internal Evidence arising from the Letter of it. For, you must either affirm, that we are able to comprehend the Wisdom and Expedience of every thing that is wise or expedient; that human Understanding is the adequate Measure of *all* Truth; that we are neither

\* Addr. 4.49.

† Ibid.

ther fallible or finite; or you must allow, that God, from his intimate and universal Knowledge of the essential Nature of Things, their Habitudes and Relations, may, and *must*, know an eternal Fitness in certain particular Applications of them, and therefore may command *such* Applications to be made by us, though we cannot at present fully comprehend this Fitness, because we cannot sufficiently discover that Nature, in which it is originally grounded.

I agree with you again, That \* infinite Wisdom and Goodness govern all the Actions of the Deity, and that his Laws have, like his Works, both those Attributes impressed upon them. And all that the Bishop speaks on this Head, will be ultimately resolved into a just and proper Consideration, of this infinite Wisdom and Goodness, which is so essential to all the Actions of the Deity; since from hence it will follow, that if we can sufficiently prove, that God has done, or commanded any thing, that very Proof includes a Demonstration, that the Thing *thus* done, or commanded, must be both Wise and Good. And although in some Instances, we cannot now clearly discern the explicit Wisdom of every particular Law; yet we firmly believe, that both these Attributes are impressed “on “them, as well as on his Works”, because we know, that it is impossible for him to Act, but with the highest Wisdom and Goodness. You will give me leave to pursue this Comparison of his Works and Laws, which you have suggested, and I hope not further than you designed it.

To consider therefore those Works of God, which fall under every ones more immediate Observation: How many Phænomena occur daily, which

\* Ibid.

which puzzle and confound our strictest Enquiries? Look into the *Vegetable Creation*, and what Impressions of Wisdom or Goodness can we conceive, or see, in the poisonous and destructive Nature of many Plants, in the ever growing and noxious Effects of *Weeds*, &c. or how are these Impressions discernible by us, in several parts of the *Animal World*; where not a few are the perpetual Enemies of Mankind, and frequently prove destructive to us; and where many whole Species of *Beasts*, *Birds*, and *Fish*, cannot subsist, but by the immediate, and, to our Conceptions, the most barbarous, and most cruel Destruction of their Fellow-creatures? And yet I firmly, though very *implicitly*, believe, that all these *Plants*, *Beasts*, &c. were the Effects of the *Divine Goodness and Wisdom*, though I cannot demonstrate these Impressions, from any *immediate Consideration* of the Things themselves. Or,

If we cast our Eyes above us, we may reasonably collect from the *Knowledge* of these Attributes, that all those glorious Bodies, we call the fix'd Stars, are not either useless or inexpedient; but an Endeavour after as strict a Proof of either, as we have of both, in our own *Sun*, would be attended with insuperable Difficulties. As therefore, in those Proofs, which shew these things to be the Works of God, a tacit Acknowledgment is *always* included of their Use and Expediency, though sometimes we cannot adequately discover them: so, as you very justly, and as I hope not inadvertently implied, we may not be always able to trace these Impressions, in the *outward View* and Lineaments of every Law, which he is pleased to give us; though in the *inward Constitution* of them all, they are certainly

tainly the *formal* and *prevailing* Principles. On which account I readily fall in with you, that to deny, that these Impressions are on his Works, and his Laws, is, to deny that he is either wise or good, much less infinitely wise or good. But our not being able to comprehend the Methods, in which these Attributes will display their Efficacy, in either Case, is no Denial of their being there; but only an humble and reasonable Acknowledgment of the *Finiteness* of our own Understandings. For,

As you affirm, in your usual way of Question,  
 \* *Are we not certain from his Wisdom, that he can't be mistaken in the Nature of the Things he commands, or command useless or needless Things, such as neither tend to his own, or Creatures Good?* So, that what you add, that if such commands are inconsistent with his Wisdom, they must certainly be so with his Goodness, may be safely allow'd to you by any one, who denies that God can give Commands, inconsistent with any one, either of his natural, or moral Perfections. And the present Question enquires only, whether God can command any Thing, whose Wisdom and Expediency we cannot see, and by demonstrating to us that it is his Command, by that Demonstration induce an Obligation on us to receive and obey it. And that there is nothing contradictory to the Principles of human Reason, in considering such Commands as *possible* or *obligatory*, has been fully shewn. From whence we must conclude with his Lordship, that "Reason does not " think itself at Liberty to call in question the " Wisdom and Expediency of any part, after it is " satisfied that the whole comes from God."

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\* Ibid.

If I have been more particular in answering these Objections of yours, than some Men of Religion and Learning may think, the weight of them required; I hope they will excuse me, when I let them know, that it is a *Common-place Trap* to catch undistinguishing and raw Disciples; and that the greatest Part of your *Address* is made up of little else, but Variations and Repetitions of the same Argument in different Lights. And of this sort is what follows, *viz.* *He (the Bishop) does not tell us, how we can be satisfied the whole comes from God, if it teaches such things as will not bear the Test of Reason, or is inconsistent with the natural Notions Reason gives us of the Being and Attributes of God, and the essential difference between Good and Evil.* Here, if “by not bearing the Test of Reason”, and “by being inconsistent with the natural “Notions which Reason gives us, &c.” you design to convey the same Idea; then his *Lordship* has expressly told us, that such Contradictions are to be rejected, and so we are agreed. But, if by “not bearing the Test of Reason”, you would be understood to mean Things, which we cannot wholly comprehend or account for, by the immediate Application of our Reason; then, to avoid saying the same things over again, I must refer you to what goes before, where I have distinctly proved, that the Reception of such things, upon a *Certainty* of their being contained in a *Divine Revelation*, is an *Act* of the *highest and best improved Reason*.

For though the *formal Motive* of our Belief, in these particular Cases, is the *Authority* of the Revealer; yet the Cause of our Reception of, or Submission to, the Revelation in general, proceeds from the Determinations of our *own Reason*;

son ; and both are *equally* the Acts of Reason, the one necessarily consequential to the other. And here his *Lordship* has the Satisfaction to think with the learned *Grotius*, who where he is answering your Objection in the Mouth of *Covarruvias* a *Spanish Bishop*, says ; \* *God who is so the Author of Nature, that he may act freely above Nature, has a right of prescribing Laws to us, even in Things which are in their own nature free and indefinite.*

I beg leave to observe here, that what you quote from an acute Divine, as you stile him, in support of your present Argument, makes entirely against you, *viz.* "A Man may acknowledge that he was taught from Revelation to reason right about the Obligations of Morality, just as he may confess that he was taught to reason right about philosophical Matters, from the Discoveries made in Philosophy by Sir *Isaac Newton*: but still Reason is Reason, however discovered, and must be attended to by Man as Man". Now however true it may be, "that still Reason is Reason, &c". yet, since the Man, who is taught to reason right about the Obligations of Morality from Revelation, must receive from thence some Helps and Communications of Knowledge, which he had not before; as well as the Man, who is taught by the Discoveries of Sir *Isaac Newton*, must infer from Maxims and Conclusions *unknown* before: this Citation entirely overthrows your Hypothesis, by acknowledging, that human Reason may be *instructed* by Revelation; as in the other

\* *Deus, qui ita natura est, ut & supra naturam agat libere, jus habet, nobis Legis praescribendi etiam de his Rebus, quæ natura sua liberæ indefinitæq; sunt. Grot. de jur. Bel. L. 2. c. I. 10. 1.*

Instance by Sir Isaac Newton, and that consequently it is not so sufficient without, as it is with these Improvements. I mean this Observation to let you see, it is the Fate of others, besides “\* very Learned Men to prove, what they endeavour to confute”, or else, I think, you would never have lent us this Assistance. For to shew the same Thought in another view, let it be the Power of human Sight that makes Discoveries through a *Telescope*, yet the manner in which these Discoveries are made, is so far from complimenting our Vanity, that it openly shews and upbraids the *Defects* of Nature.

I shall conclude this Head, with desiring the Reader seriously to consider, what I hope has been sufficiently shewn, that the Nature of *Truth* does by no means depend on our Abilities to comprehend it; as also, that any particular Truth's being *level* to our Understanding, or *above* the Reach of it, is barely *relative* to our means of Knowledge, and entirely *foreign* to the intrinsick Nature of it. And this one Consideration rightly applied, is more then enough to dispel all that cloud of Sophistry, with which you have endeavoured to obscure those two most plain, I had almost said, self-evident Truths, wherein his *Lordship* † has so justly placed the true and proper use of Reason.

*First*, That Reason is to judge and determine concerning the Evidences of a Revelation pretended to come from God.

*Secondly*, That when Reason has duly weighed these Evidences, and pronounced them to be full and conclusive, then Reason is to pay an universal

\* Addr. p. 55.

† Past. Lett. p. 4\* 5.

sal and uniform Obedience to the Contents of a Revelation so proved and received.

I go on now to find out, and then remove your Objections, made to what is contain'd under the second general Head of the *Pastoral Letter*; which is,

\* *That Reason of it self is an insufficient Guide in Matters of Religion.* The Terms of this Position having been already stated, and the plain Sense of it secured against all reasonable Exception; I shall consider those Cautions, which his *Lordship* wisely interposes, against several “fallacious Arguings” on this Point, and what you object in Opposition to them. Neither can I wonder at the Zeal, of one so obstinately devoted to the Propagation of *Error*, in the Defence of these sophistical Out-works, since the main strength of your Cause, when reduced to support itself by its own natural Powers only, is so very weak and disconcerted in all its Measures. Of these “fallacious arguings” his *Lordship* says,

“ † One is the arguing from the Powers of  
 “ Reason in a State of *Innocence*, in which the  
 “ Understanding is supposed to be clear and  
 “ strong, and the Judgment unbiassed and free  
 “ from the Influences of inordinate Appetites and  
 “ Inclinations; to the Powers and Abilities of  
 “ Reason, under the present corrupt State of  
 “ Human Nature: In which we find by Expe-  
 “ rience, how often we are deceived, even in  
 “ Things before our Eyes, &c.”

Here you say, || *This Writer musters up several Reasons, to shew the Insufficiency of Reason; in which, whether he prevails, or not, 'tis Reason still*

\* Past. Lett. p. 7.

† Past. Lett. p. 7.

|| Addr. p. 71.

*still that carries it.* And, † *I am surprized to find that we, at present, are under a corrupt State of Nature;* since we are told, “Christianity has re-“ moved us from the State of Brutes, and ad-“ vanced us to the Perfection of Angels.” But why are not Men now as much created in a State of Innocency, and continue in it ’till they offend against a known Law, as Adam and Eve did? &c.

I see that Cautions against fallacious Arguing have so little Effect on you, that you can’t forbear, even for an Instant: but like an *harden’d Pick-pocket*, are at Work while the *Court* is *Sitting*. Whether he prevails or not, you say, ‘tis *Reason still that carries it*. But if you please to consider, that when his *Lordship*, having his Reason, assisted by the Light of Revelation, shews the Insufficiency of mere natural Reason; the Ideas which the Word *Reason* conveys to us, are very different and distinct; and when this faint Attempt after *Wit*, which you know is none of your own, is stripp’d from the Cover of *Equivocation*, you’ll find what you’ll not be very fond of, that if he (the *Bishop*) prevails, it is Reason, assisted by Revelation, carries it against Reason without this Assistance.

You are much surpriz’d, it seems, “at our “ being at present under a corrupt State, since “ we are told Christianity has removed us from a “ State of Brutes, &c. I could wish I had any Reason to be surpriz’d at, what is so familiar to you, this false Representation of the *Pastoral Letter*; which says, \* “ One great End of the “ Gospel Revelation is to remove us from a State “ of Brutes, and advance us to the Perfection of “ Angels.” Which End or Design for the Accom-

† Ib.

\* *Past. Lett. p. 51.*

complishment of a *future* Event, you, to serve a Purpose, change into an *actual* Performance.

What the *Bishop* here affirms, that “ there is no arguing from the Powers of Reason in a State, in which the Understanding is *supposed to be strong, &c.*” to the Powers of Reason in the opposite State, is as clear, as that an Argument taken from the supposed Strength of a Man in Health and Youth, will never hold to prove the same Strength remaining amidst the Decays of old Age and Sickness. And *unassisted* Reason will inform us, that it is a very equitable, nay a necessary Concession to suppose, that the *first* Man was created absolutely *innocent*, as being the immediate Production of the Almighty, and consequently not only having a strong and perfect View of his Duty, but also without any *corrupt* Inclination to transgress, since such Inclinations and absolute *Innocence* are repugnant. That *Adam* then, (if you’ll graciously allow him to be the *first* Man) was perfect in all Points of *human* Perfection, must be allowed. But that his *Posterity* was ever so of old, or did not then, and do not to this present Hour, discover corrupt Inclinations, even before in the natural Course of Things they are capable of knowing the *Terms* of Duty, is contrary to all the Historical Observations of former Ages, and all the Experience of our own, against which there can be no Argument.

*Adam* then was innocent as from God, but as Sin and Virtue, like Light and Darkness, naturally take Possession, according as they happen to prevail, to the *Exclusion* of each other; *Adam*, by the Commission of Sin, lessened the Empire of Virtue within himself, and grew proportionably imperfect and defective. And these Perso-

nal Imperfections and Defects being once incorporated into the Nature of our first Parents, it is most consonant to Reason, that a Tendency this way should be propagated in all their traditional Off-spring; as being their Off-spring no further, than as they inherit and partake their Nature; if partially, but partial; if totally, total. So that there is no great Difficulty in perceiving why the Posterity of *Adam*, who are all of us the Work of *Sinners*, are not so perfect or uncorrupt, as he was in the State of *Innocence*, who was the immediate *Work of God*. On which it follows, that the Caution which his \* *Lordship* has given against this fallacious Argument, is both just and necessary.

“ Another fallacious way of arguing, *bis Lordship says*, is, that as Reason is our Guide in the Affairs of this Life, it may be also our Guide in Religion, and the Concerns of the next Life. Whereas in one it has the Assistance of Sense, and Experience, and Observation; but in the other, it is left in great Measure to Conjecture and Speculation.” † Whereas, say you, the contrary of this is true, that in the Affairs of this Life, though Reason is our Guide, and we have the Assistance of Sense, Experience and Observation; yet we may greatly mistake to our vast Prejudice: But 'tis otherwise in Relation to the Life to come; there no Mistake can turn to our Prejudice, if we do our best to find out the Will of God, and act according to it. And, I think, 'tis no small Reflection on Religion to represent it so uncertain, as that it is in great Measure, notwithstanding the utmost our Reason can do to find it out, left to Conjecture and Speculation.

Here

\* Past. Lett. p. 8.

† Addr. p. 74.

Here you purposely mistake the *true State of the Question*, which regards only that high Probability, or *moral Certainty* of Success, which usually follows from an Application of such Means, as have in themselves a direct and natural Influence on the Production of the Effect. And that human Reason, in those Instances where it has the Assistance of the *sensible Perception* of the Object, and a presaging kind of Knowledge drawn from the Complex View of repeated *Experience*, as well as the *Observations* both of Antiquity, and of the present Age, is much likelier to discover and apply these Means, than in other Cases, where it is left in great Measure to Conjecture and Speculation, every one must grant, on a bare Knowledge even of the Terms themselves. That the special Interposition of the *divine Providence*, that the *private Designs*, or the *open Power* of Men ill affected to us, do sometimes so overrule and cross the Tendency of our Endeavours thus directed, that the *Event* proves unfortunate, is a Consideration entirely foreign to the Idea of the Sufficiency we are now looking after; which includes only comparative Degrees of *moral Certainty*. As therefore a *Possibility* of ill Success, in Things thus concerted for the Use of the present Life, does not precisely affect the Sufficiency of our Guide, whose natural *Causality*, if I may be allowed that Language, is only here considered; so neither can the *Event*, if happy, in regard to the other Life, alter those distinct Relations of Things, on which this Comparison is founded. For,

That *Mistakes do not*, as you say, *in Religion turn to our Prejudice*, is entirely owing to the infinite Goodness of God, who out of Regard to our doing *our best to find out his Will, and act according to it*,

may, and does accept us: Yet since these Mistakes must proceed from, and indeed are nothing else but the Application of improper, ill-judged and inadequate *Means*, nothing can be more certain, than that when two *Guides* are compared together, the one using *Means* which have a *proper* and *natural* Influence on the End, the other applying such as are *improper* and *unnatural*; the first must appear in the Eyes of all Men of common Understanding, a much more *sufficient Guide* than the last; for an Argument taken from the *Event*, has nothing to do in either Case. That Preference then, which the *Bishop* has here given to our Reason, in regard to the present Life, is undoubtedly true, and the Caution seasonable. And whatever you may think, if it can be proved in *Fact*, as in this *Pastoral Letter* it most fully is, that the Concerns of another Life, without Revelation, “are left, in “a great Measure, to Conjecture and Speculation,” it is not in our Power to reverse it.

\* But the *Pastoral Writer* says, † “Tis unfair to “interpret a Zeal that is shewn for Reveal’d Religion, as a *Disregard of Morality*;” whereas you affirm, *The Unfairness lies in those who introduce such Things into Reveal’d Religion, as tend to depreciate Morality, in putting indifferent and needless Things upon a Level with it; much more in preferring them above it.* What sort of People this Reflection belongs to, you best know; the Reveal’d Religion we contend for, contains in it, as the *Bishop* very justly observes in the Place you cite, “The whole Body of the Moral Law, as “an essential Part of the Christian Institution,” &c. From whence his *Lordship* rightly concludes, that this Imputation is *false*. Neither

am

\* Addr. p. 67.

† Past. Lett. p. 9.

am I able to conceive, that there can be any Commands in a divine Revelation *indifferent* to Mankind, since nothing which God commands can be so to us, much less *needless* as you imagine.

Again, you blame the *Bishop* for saying, “ \* Another Advantage which the Enemies of Revelation very unduly take to advance the Strength and Power of natural Reason in Matters of Religion, is the taking an Estimate of those Powers from Books upon the Subject of Morality, that have been written since the Christian Revelation was made; many of which are clear and uniform both in the Measures of Duty, and in the Motions to the Performance of it: ” † You say here, you should be glad, could this Writer shew any Thing ’till the seventeenth Century, that can be compared with the Ethicks of Aristotle, and the Offices of Tully; and what we have met with since that Time, has been chiefly owing to Laymen, particularly Grotius and Puffendorf,

Good Mr. *Addressee* not too fast; the *Bishop* is not here speaking of the Works of his || *Holy Fathers*, as you scornfully stile them, but of your *Pious Heathens*, and *Holy Infidels*, who by Light borrow’d from Revelation, have been thus clear and uniform, &c. And I am sure the Persons to whom this Eulogy belongs, being thus determined, it will readily pass your Office. *Seneca*, *Epicetus*, *Antoninus*, *Hierocles*, &c. among the *Ancients*, I avoid giving you a Catalogue of the *Moderns*, since no one questions your Intimacy with their Works; only it may be worth your while, when at Leisure to recollect, whether *Grotius* and *Puffendorf* had not some Knowledge of the *Christian Revelation*, or whether Men

E 2      you

\* *Past. Lett.* p. 12.    † *Addr.* p. 93.    || + *Ib.*

you are sometimes fond of, *Cumberland* and *Wolaston* were not *Clergymen*.

The next Passage you dislike, has been so abused in your Quotation, that I must give it from the *Pastoral Letter* it self, viz. \* “ Much less could “ the Light of Nature acquaint them with the “ Method God has ordained and established for “ the Recovery of lost Man; to effect a Recon-“ ciliation between God and Man, to exercise his “ Goodness without the Violation of his Justice; “ and not only to make the Pardon of Sinners “ consistent with the Wisdom of his Govern-“ ment, the Honour of his Laws, and his Ha-“ tred of Sin, so as to render their Salvation “ possible; but to give them the strongest *Affu-*  
*rances* of Pardon and Favour, upon the plain  
“ Conditions of Faith and Repentance. These  
“ are Things that depend wholly upon Revela-“ tion; and without the Knowledge of these,  
“ Mankind must remain in a perplex'd and de-“ sponding State, as to the Pardon of Sin, and  
“ the Favour of God.” Here you very trag-“ically exclaim, † *Can any Thing be more inconsistent with the Character of a Being of impartial, universal, and infinite Benevolence, than to leave all his Children, for so many Ages together, and the greatest Part to this Day, in a desponding State, as to their Possibility of being saved? Can any Man read this without Horror and Detestation? Or can this Writer say worse of the very worst of Beings, &c.*

Whereas on a Perusal of this Section, any one will easily see that the *Bishop* asserts nothing expressly concerning the future Possibility or Impossibility of a *Sinners* Salvation, on a supposed *Re-pentance*; but only that they were ignorant, “ from the Light of Nature, of that Method,

by

\* *Past. Lett. p. 14, 15.*

† *Addr. p. 6.*

" by which God would not only make their Salvation possible, but also give them the strongest Assurances of Pardon and Favour, upon the plain Terms of Faith and Repentance." And since, as his Lordship adds, " The Comfort they could raise from one Attribute, would be check'd by the Consideration of another, so as not to fix a guilty Mind in a state of solid and well-grounded Comfort;" a guilty Mind that is not thus fix'd, must of Necessity be perplex'd, and as far as destitute of a well-grounded Hope, so far despousing. And this is what the Author to the Hebrews has express'd in the same Manner, where he says, that *Christ was to deliver them, who through Fear of Death, were all their Life-time subject unto Bondage;* or, the continued Terrors of these perplexing Fears, and their consequent Despondencies, as to their Condition in a future State.

For God is not here considered, as exercising an absolute Dominion over the Works of his own Hands, but as condescending to the limited Jurisdiction of a reasonable Government over reasonable Creatures; and the Sanctions of Laws being their Security, Penalties corresponding to Demerits, will be found as necessary, as Rewards proportioned to Virtue; and in the due Administration of these, the Honour and Dignity of Government does properly consist; from whence, natural Reason must place the Idea of the divine Justice, in a regular, constant Application of these Sanctions. Here then, let us suppose a Sinner who has this Idea, troubled at the Review of his past Life, and resolved to change, but at the same Time fearful, as the nature of Guilt is, whether his Governor, whose Honour consists, as much in punishing Vice, as in rewarding Virtue,

\* Heb. ii. 15.

tue, can, as his *Lordship* speaks, “consistently  
“ with the Wisdom of his Government, the  
“ Honour of his Laws, and his Hatred of Sin,  
“ entirely pardon his Misbehaviour”; especially  
in those Instances, where no Satisfaction or  
Restitution can be made to the injured Party, as  
in the Crimes of *Murder*, *Adultery*, &c. so that  
his Account remains to be wholly made up at the  
impartial Bar of Justice.

In such a Conjunction of Circumstances, it  
will be much easier to determine, that the  
*Sinner* must be involved in great and terrible  
*Uncertainties*; than to put bounds to  
the Degrees of them without Revelation, or  
give him a full Assurance of their entire Pardon.  
For as mere Reason speaks in the Mouth of *Tully*,  
\* “ of Wickednesses against Men, and of Impieties,  
there is no *Expiation*”. And in another  
Place, speaking of that mighty Unwillingness  
and Reluctancy with which wicked Men submit  
to Death, he makes no mention of (what is now  
so common in every Man’s Mouth) the Advantage  
of *Repentance*, but says, † “ they are torment-  
ed in a prodigious Manner, as if even an im-  
mortal Punishment would follow on a Life  
wickedly led”. So little did the great Men  
of old depend on what the Gospel has made  
known to us, as the *Anchor* of our future Hopes.  
However, it is beyond Dispute certain, that the  
Light of Nature could not discover the Methods,  
through which God would effect such a Pardon;  
which is the Sum of what his *Lordship* here  
asserts.

And

\* At vero scelerum in homines atq; Impietatem nulla est  
expiatio. *Tull. de Leg.* 1. 1. 14.

† Cruciantur mirum in modum, quasi flagitiose actam  
vitam poena etiam sit immortalis consecutra. *De Consol.*

And in Truth, you virtually confess the Weakness of your Argument taken from the Strength of Nature, when in the next Page you call in *Revelation* to prove, that God will pardon Sinners on Repentance; \* “*That there is joy in Heaven over one Sinner that repenteth*, that God does not desire the Death of a Sinner, and add, *God did not want to be reconciled to the World, but the World having departed from God, wanted to be reconciled to him*; and it was the *Business of Christ and his Apostles to teach them those moral Rules, which would reconcile them to God*. Hence the Apostle says, † *We pray you in Christ's stead, that you be reconciled unto God*”.

You know, I have more than once observed, that there is a kind of disastrous *Fatality* attends your Explanations of *Scripture*: in which, I cannot clearly comprehend what is meant by *God's not wanting to be reconciled unto the World*; it cannot be, that he was not *desirous* of the Reconciliation, since the first Proposals came from him; but, that the World had departed from God, is plain enough, and consequently that during this departure, they must have been in a very melancholy and deplorable Condition; or else to be with God, and to depart from God, will be the same thing; from whence, as you express it, *they wanted to be reconciled unto God*; but no one wants to be reconciled, unless it be to remove Marks of *Displeasure*, and obtain the Advantages of *Favour*. In order therefore to effect this happy Change of Circumstances, it was the *Business*, you say, *of Christ and his Apostles to teach them those moral Rules which would reconcile them to God*. But why the *Business* of Christ and his Apostles, Messengers sent from God, if bare Reason

\* *Addr. p. 7.*

† *2 Cor. v. 18, 19.*

Reason had been sufficient? or can any one teach another, what that other *knows* before? If then these moral Rules you speak of, were taught to the World by *Christ* and his *Apostles*, it is very plain, the World must have been ignorant of them before their Preaching. And these Methods of Reconciliation, whose Necessity you here acknowledge, setting aside the Sanctuary you take in moral Rules, are, in truth, the greatest matter of Debate between the *Bishop* and yourself: Remember this, Mr. *Addreffer*, and my Title-Page, when you talk again of *Consistency* in other Mens Writings.

But to go on. \* His *Lordship* recounting "some Doctrines taught by the Philosophers, " which directly tended to encourage Vice and "Wickedness in the World," says—"such also "was the Doctrine of *Fate*, or Men's doing "every thing through *Necessity*, and not by "Choice; which takes away all Virtue and "Vice, and leaves no Place for Rewards or "Punishments, either here or hereafter; and "yet this was the avow'd Doctrine of one famous "Sect among them" (viz. the *Stoicks*.) This Reflection, you say, † as ill *Fate* will have it, does not touch the *Stoicks*, or indeed any of the *Ancients*; who, as it is shewn by Mr. *Wollafton*, though generally Fatalists, yet do not seem to have thought they were not Masters of their own Actions.

Mr. *Wollafton* is very far from being positive in the Place you cite, where having, by great Variety of Arguments, endeavour'd to prove, that "a particular Providence may be compatible

\* *Past. Lett.* p. 26.

† *Addr.* p. 98.

"tible with the natural Freedom of Mens Actions." He adds, " \*The Ancients, I am persuaded; had some such Thoughts as these. For they were generally Fatalists, and yet do not seem to have thought, that they were not Masters of their own Actions." If Mr. Wollaston had been infallible, " some such Thoughts as these" and "do not seem" could never have determin'd any Question, whose just Resolution must come from the Testimony of ancient and approved Authors. Now,

† Diogenes Laertius, in the Life of Zeno, affirms, " That Chrysippus, in his Books concerning Fate, asserts, that all Things are brought to pass by Fate; and in like manner Posidonius, in his second Book of Fate, and Zeno; also Boethus, in his eleventh Book of Fate. Now Fate is a connected Cause of Existencies, or the Method by which the World is administred; and they say that there are all sorts of Divination." And when || Quintus, Tully's Brother, supports the Certainty of Divination on these Principles of the

F Stoicks;

\* Rel. Nat. Delin. p. 105.

† Καθ' εἰμαρμένον ἃ φασι τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι Χρύσιππος, ὁ τοις ψεύταις εἰμαρμένος, καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν β' ψεύταις εἰμαρμένος, καὶ Ζήνων. Βανδός ἃ ἐν αἷς εἰμαρμένος. Ἐστὶ δὲ εἰμαρμένη αἵτια τὸ οὐλῶν εἰσερχόμενον, οὐ λόγος θεοῦ ὅν οὐ κόσμος διεξάγεται. καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν υἱερεῖαν πᾶσαν φασίν. Diog. Laert. Zeno.

|| Fieri igitur omnia Fato Ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Græci εἰμαρμένον, id est, ordinem seriemque Causarum, cum causa causæ nexa rem ex se gignat, ea est ex omni æternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum, quod non futurum fuerit; eodemque modo nihil est futurum, cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes, natura contineat. Ex quo intelligitur, ut Fatum sit non id quod super-

*Stoicks*; He says, “ Reason therefore compels us  
 “ to confess, that all Things are done by *Fate*.  
 “ I call that *Fate*, which the Greeks call *εἰωνία*,  
 “ i. e. the Order and Series of *Causes*; when a  
 “ Cause connected to a Cause, produces any  
 “ Thing from *itself*. This is the everlasting  
 “ Truth, flowing from all Eternity. Since then  
 “ this is the Case, *nothing* has been done which  
 “ was not future; and in the same manner, *no-*  
 “ *thing* is future, whose Causes *efficient* of that  
 “ very *Thing* Nature does not contain. From  
 “ whence we understand, that *Fate* is not that  
 “ which is *superstitiously*, but that which is *Phy-*  
 “ *sically* so called, the *eternal Cause* of Things;  
 “ both why those which are passed were done,  
 “ why those that are instant can be done, and  
 “ why those that follow will be done.”

And to the same Purpose *Cotta* speaks, where he  
 reasons with *Balbus the Stoick*. \*“ Those Things  
 “ follow which are future, for no one can *avoid*  
 “ what is future—especially when you your  
 “ selves (the *Stoicks*) affirm, that all Things are  
 “ done by *Fate*; and that what was always true  
 “ from all Eternity is *Fate*. What therefore  
 “ does it avail, or how does it help our Caution,  
 “ to know any *Thing* that is future, when it  
 “ will *certainly* come to pass?” From these *Autho-*  
*rities* it is very plain, that the *Stoical Doctrine*  
 concerning *Fate*, included all those pernicious

superstitiose, sed id quod Physice dicitur causa æterna rerum,  
 cur & ea, quæ præterierunt, facta sint, & quæ instant, fiant,  
 & quæ sequuntur futura sint. *Tull. de Divin.* L. I. §. 55.

\* Sequuntur, quæ futura sunt, effugere enim nemo id  
 potest, quod futurum est.—Præsertim, cum vos iidem  
 Fato fieri dicatis omnia: quod autem semper ex omni æterni-  
 tate verum fuerit, id esse Fatum. Quid igitur juvat, aut quid  
 affert ad cavendum, scire aliquid futurum, cum id certe fu-  
 turum sit. *Tull. de Nat. Deor.* L. III. §. 6.

Errors which the *Bishop* charges it with, since it extended it self to all Things, and had a true *Physical Efficiency* on the Production of them.

His *Lordship*, in Pursuance of the same Subject, says, \* “ Nor in private Life can we reasonably hope or expect to find among them the great Virtues of Love, Meekness and Forgiveness, when we find *Socrates* declaring it neither unjust nor revengeful to rejoice in the Calamities of our Enemies: And *Cicero* expressly approving and professing *Revenge*, and *Aristotle*, speaking of Meekness, not only as a Effect of the Mind, and as carrying in it too great a Disposition to forgive, but calling the patient enduring of Reproach, the Spirit of a Slave.”

Here you have Assurance enough to affirm, that \* *Cicero* in this Place speaks of no other Revenge, than that for which Magistracy was instituted. But what had the *Magistrate* to do with that private Quarrel between *Dionysius* and *Tully*, not founded in Matters cognizable in the publick Courts, but in that Disrespect and Neglect which the first shew'd to the latter? Of which *Tully* thus complains in the Place cited by his *Lordship*, + — “ By whom this my present Fortune is most vilely despised; I hate the Man, and will hate him, and wish I could be revenged of him.” And yet, if we will take your Word, this is “ no other Revenge than that for which Magistracy was instituted.” And

\* *Past. Lett. p. 29.*

+ *Addr. p. 94.*

\* *A quo impurissime hæc nostra fortuna despecta est: odi hominem & odio;* utinam ulcisci possem. *Ep. ad Att. L. IX. Ep. 12.*

in another Place *Tully* says, || “The first Office  
“ of Justice is, that no one should harm any one,  
“ unless provoked by an Injury.” And \* “there  
“ are some sorts of Duties to be observed, even  
“ toward those from whom you have received  
“ an Injury; for there is a Measure of re-  
“ venging.” The Practice of Revenge is here  
allow’d to *private* Men; the only Thing in Que-  
stion is, how far it is to be extended.

You are pleased to allow, that his *Lordship* has cited *Socrates* fairly as to the *Letter*; but then you would have us think, that this rejoicing over our Enemies, was particularly confined to “† their Defeat and Victories gain’d over them “in a just War”. Whereas, the whole Subject regards *private* Life; and the chief Design of that Place, where this is incidentally mention’d, is to shew, that there is a real Mixture of Grief and Pleasure in the *use* of our Passions, *viz.* ♦ “*Prot.* But the Mixture of *Griefs* and *Pleasures* “in these Subjects is not yet manifest to me. “*Socr.* First understand the *Force* of Envy. “*Prot.* Only tell me. *Socr.* Is there any Grief “or Pleasure that is unjust? *Prot.* Yes, this “must be. *Socr.* It can be therefore neither “unjust or revengeful to rejoice in the Cala-“mities of our Enemies”. And on Concessions

|| *Justitiae* primum munus est, ut necui quis noceat, nisi lacesitus *injuria*. *Tull. Off. Q. 1. §. 7.*

\* Sunt autem quædam Officia adversus eos servanda a quibus *injuriam* acceperis. Est enim ulciscendi & puniendi modus. *Ib. §. 11.*

† *Addr. p. 95.*

‡ ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ γάρ οὐ τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν μέχεις εὐτέλεις ὑπὸ μοὶ χαταφανής. ΣΩΚ. Τὴν πίνουν τῷ φθόνῳ δύναμιν λαίβε τραῦτον. ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον. ΣΩΚ. Λύπη πάσι ἀδικός δέται καὶ ἡδονή; ΠΡΩ. Τέτο μὲν ἀναίγεται. ΣΩΚ. Οὐκέντι μὲν τοῖς τῇ ἐχθρῶν χακοῖς θτ' ἀδικον, εἴτε φθονεῖσθαι δέται τὸ χαίρειν. *Plat. Phileb. p. 46.* Ed. H. Steph.

of

of this Nature, *Socrates* goes on to prove his Position, “the Mixture of Grief and Pleasure”, without any mention of those *Wars* or *Victories* of which you pretend to dream.

But *Aristotle* you say, || speaking of the defective Extreme of the Virtue of Meekness, says, “not to be angry when there is just Cause, is to be a Fool”, &c. The Words referr’d to are these. “We, says the Philosopher, \* place Meekness in the Middle, inclining to the defective Extreme, which is without a settled Name”. —“The meek Man seems to err on the defective side, for he is not revengeful, but rather forgiving. But this Defect, whether it be a Vacuity of Anger, or whatever else, is blamed” —“Not being inclined to Anger, he is not desirous of Revenge, but patiently to endure Reproaches offered to ones self or Family, is the Spirit of a Slave”. These literal Translations of the Passages in debate, are sufficient to shew that exact Truth and Punctuality with which his Lordship has produced them, as well as your profligate disregard to both.

But what Mr. Addresser, † can be said to that vile and low Manner in which you proceed, so much beneath not only a Gentleman, but every one who makes the least Pretence to common Ingenuity. “To shew, say you, this Writer’s (the Bishop’s) Sincerity to all that understand only

|| Addr. p. 95.

\* Ἐπὶ τὸν μέσον τὸ προσόπητα σέργουν, τοὺς τὸ ἔλεγχον ἀποκλίνουσιν, αἰσθένουσιν δὲ τούτου. — Αμαρτίαινεν δὲ οὐδεῖς μᾶλλον δῆλον τὸ ἔλεγχον· διὸ πανηρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶθος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικὸς. Ή δὲ ἔλεγχος, εἴτε ἀργυροσία πίστον, εἴτε δὲ πάντοτε, φέρεται. — Μὴ δρακόντειος τε εἰναι αἱμυντικὸς. Τὸ δὲ προτιλαχθόμενον διέχει, καὶ τὸ δίκειος πειρᾶν, αὐδεξιοδῶδες. Arist. Eth. L. IV. c. 5.

† Addr. p. 94.

“ English;

" English; I shall mention what Dr. Clarke quotes from him (Cicero) on this Head, who says, putting down the Places he quotes in the Margin". But since you have not thought fit to do, as the Doctor did, i.e. put down the Places in the Margin,—I must transcribe it from the Doctor's own Works, and in the Manner he has printed it. *Evid. of Nat. and Rev. Rel.* p. 75, 76. *Edit. 4th.* " Man, says he, cannot, \* without

\* Ex quo efficitur, acting contrary to the Reason of his own Mind, and dientem homini nocere transgressing the plain and non posse. *Cic. de off.* known Law of his Being, *Lib. 3.* do willingly any Hurt and

Mischief to any Man; no not even to those,

+ ἐπεὶ δέξασθαι θεοῖν  
δέ, εἰς γάνως ποιεῖν  
ὑδίνα ἀνθρώπουν, εἰδότες  
ἀνθεῖν πάχην τούτων.  
Plato in Crit.

+ who have first injured him; but ought for the publick Benefit to endeavour to appease with Gentleness rather than exasperate with Retaliations;

and finally, to comprehend all in one

|| Tum illud effici, Word, (which is the top quod quibusdam incredibile videatur, sit autem necessarium, ut nibilis esse plusquam alterum diligat. *Cic. de Log.* lib. 1. and compleat Perfection of this great Duty) ought to || love all others as himself. This is the Argumentation of that great Master *Cicero.*"

So that upon a true State of the Matter, your Argument stands thus: The Bishop is insincere, when he quotes Cicero as approving and professing Revenge, because Dr. Clarke has cited a Passage from Plato, to prove that Plato did not allow it. An Argument as worthy of your Understanding, as the Management of it is of your Integrity. Tho' I cannot think it according to that Accuracy, with which the Doctor usually writ,

to

to call the foregoing Propositions the Argumentation of *Cicero*; yet, he must be allowed to have taken sufficient Caution against leading any one into a Mistake, by referring to the Opinion of *Plato* expressly set down in the Margin; and that you yourself did not overlook it, (speaking literally) is not only evident from the Nature of reading and transcribing, but from the Use you have made of this very Citation from *Plato*, in your next Paragraph.

Lay your Hand for once upon your *Heart*, Mr. *Addressee*, and if all Sentiments of *Truth* and *Honour* are not utterly extinguished, cease from these wretched dirty Practices of misrepresenting, and thereby exposing to the ill Opinion of Mankind, both the Living, and the Dead; reflect on those essential Differences you so often mention, and dare to trust your Cause to the eternal Strength of Light and Truth; or dare utterly to abandon what can receive no Establishment from either of them.

But \* *If this Writer had read Grotius, l. 2. c. 20.* you say, *he would then have plainly seen what the Ancients thought of this Matter, and how awkwardly this Charge is now brought against their Morality.* Now the Chapter here referr'd to, treats of Punishments in general, of which Revenge is considered as one Species; and Sect. the fifth the Author declares it naturally unlawful, when its sole Object is the Pain and Misery of the Offender. † “ Because in the mere Grief of an Enemy, considered in that View only, there is no-

\* Addr. p. 95.

† In solo autem inimici dolore, ita nude spectato, nullum est bonum, nisi falsum & imaginarium. *Grot. de Jure Bell. l. 2. c. 20. Sect. 5.*

“ thing

" thing but a false and imaginary Good. \* And  
 " in this Sense not only Christians but Philosophers blame Revenge." When it is lawful, we  
 are told, Sect. VIII. of the same Chapter; and these three Methods being proposed, by which a Man may secure himself from the Repetition of Injuries; viz. † "First, If the Man who has offended is taken out of the way; then if the Power of hurting any one is taken from him; lastly, if he is taught from his own Sufferings, not to offend others." He concludes thus: "If || Revenge, even that which is private, is directed to these Ends, and within the Bounds of Equity, if we consider the bare Law of Nature, i. e. abstracted from divine and human Laws, and those Circumstances which are not necessary to the thing itself, such Revenge is not unlawful, whether it be executed by him who is personally hurt, or by any other; since it is agreeable to Nature, that one Man should help another." Thus that great Author. From whence any one may make a certain and easy Judgment, who knows the Sentiments of Grotius best, his Lordship or your self.

The next thing you dislike, is that clear and full View which his ‡ Lordship has given us of the

\* Atque hoc sensu ultionem improbant in hominibus, non Christiani modo doctores, sed & Philosophi. *Ibid.*

† Primum si tollatur qui deliquit, deinde si vires nocendi ei adimantur, postremo si malo suo dedoceatur delinquere. *De Jure Belli. I. 2. c. 20. Sect. 8.*

|| Ad hos ergo fines, & intra æqui terminos, si dirigatur vindicatio, etiam privata; si jus nudum naturæ, id est, abductum à legibus divinis humanisque, & ab his quæ non necessario rei accidunt, non est illicita: five fiat ab ipso, qui læsus est, five ab alio, quando hominem ab homine adjuvari, naturæ est consentaneum. *Ib. Par. 2.*

‡ Past. Lett. p. 32.

Absurdities and Abominations that were introduced into "Worship, Doctrine, and Practice" of Nations unknown to the Ancients, and his proposing it "as a way of judging what the State of Religion in any Country is like to be, where natural Reason is their only Guide." This Account you very judiciously seem to undervalue, as being made, you say, \* "by a Divine of North-Britain;" as if the Nature of Truth could not extend itself beyond the Frontiers of Berwick upon Tweed: And yet you think it reasonable to quote † a *Divine* born in the same Country, for one of the most severe Reflections that was ever thrown on a Body of Men. On a summary Recital of these *Absurdities*, the *Bishop* adds:

|| "These, and the like Instances of Corruption in Worship, Doctrine, and Practice, which have prevailed, and do still prevail, in several Parts of the Heathen World, may further show the Insufficiency of *Natural Reason* to be a Guide in Religion; and into what monstrous Opinions and Practices whole Nations may be led, where that is their Guide, without any Help from Revelation. Nor will it take off the Force of this Argument, to say, that these were owing to an *undue Use* of their Reason, which is in Effect to beg the Question; or that the Measure of Reason they had was low, and imperfect, since they appeared to be skillful and dextrous enough in worldly Matters, in the Arts of annoying their Neighbours, and defending themselves against Incursions; in entering into Leagues for their mutual Defence, and conducting the ordinary Affairs of Life according to the Manners and Customs of their

\* Addr. p. 23.

† Ibid. p. 36.

|| Past. Lett. p. 35.<sup>o</sup>

“ several Countries. Nor are the Absurdities in  
 “ Religion that have been found among them,  
 “ greater than those which have been found a-  
 “ mong the most polite Nations before the Pub-  
 “ lication of the Gospel; which are a joint Proof,  
 “ &c.”

\* What this Writer here advances, you say, must not only please the Popish Priests, who, on Pretence that Reason is an incompetent Guide in religious Matters, set up their Church as infallible; but puts an unanswerable Argument into the Mouths of such, if there were any such before he wrote, as are against all Religion. They will cry, if the Practice of Idolatry, and all those other Things which he calls abominable, were Crimes in these Pagans, then the due Use of Reason in religious Matters, which led them into these Practices, must be equally criminal. And, indeed, upon Supposition that Men fell into Idolatry, and other as absurd Things, by the Use of their Reason, it must either have been their Duty to observe them most religiously, as being the Product of the only Guide God gave them in Matters of Religion; or else, since there is no Medium, conclude that Religion did not concern them; and they were faulty in applying their Reason about a Matter Reason had not qualified them to judge; as it had about worldly Matters, in the managing of which, he supposes they were dextrous enough.

A Popish Priest, who can find any extraordinary pleasure in arguing from what is here said, must have a great deal of your Logick in him, or he will never attempt to prove, That, because Reason is an incompetent Guide in Matters of Religion, without Revelation, therefore it is so with Revelation. That is, because two are not

\* Addr. p. 24.

equal to four, therefore the Addition of two more cannot make that Equality. Just such inconclusive Jargon is what follows, if these things were *Crimes in these Pagans, the due use of their Reason was equally criminal.* What a Noise and Pomp is this introduced with! Whereas there is scarce a Parish Clerk within the Bills of Mortality, who cannot demonstrate, that an erroneous Conscience is to be obey'd, that the Causes of Error are *vincible* and *invincible*, and that the latter excuses from Sin. But to give it you in the Words of the Excellent Dr. *Whitby*, according to your own Stile, taken from a Book wrote before he laboured under the melancholy Circumstances of doting Age, and designing Friends. \* “ An erroneous Conscience is invincible, when the Cause of Error is either a want of *Revelation*, or of *Judgment*, or *Ignorance*, which remains with us, after that Diligence is applied which can be expected from an *honest* Man. This Conscience excuses from Sin — because there is the *Will* of acting honestly without any evil Circumstance, or such as he was obliged to avoid: And Conformity to his Rule, though it may be *speculatively* False, is *practically* Good”.

It will therefore be the Duty of every one religiously to observe, whatever the best Guide God gives him, after proper Diligence and Application made, shall direct. And according to the old Distinction, though such Worship shall be mate-

\* *Conscientia erronea est invincibilis, cum causa erroris sit vel defectus revelationis, vel judicii, vel ignorantia, quæ post adhibitam, quæ a viro honesto exigi potest, diligentiam in nobis manet. Ea excusat a Peccato — quoniam ibi est voluntas agendi honeste sine ulla Circumstantia mala, seu quam tenebatur evitare, & conformitas suæ Regulæ, quæ quamvis speculative sit falsa, est practice bona.* *Whitb. Eth. c. 4. s. 19.*

rially bad, as containing many Counter-actions to the Truth of Things, yet it is *formally* good; since Men are supposed in this Case, to act up to the best and highest Discoveries they can make; and *intentional Rectitude* must take place where *real* cannot be had. You may also observe, that Dr. *Whitby* here assigns a *want of Revelation*, as one cause of an *invincibly erroneous Conscience*; the Effects of which could never be removed by the *unassisted Efforts of Reason*. The source of all their Mistakes originally flowing from their *Inability* to arrive at just and determined Ideas of God's *natural and moral Attributes*.

For the Knowledge, both of the *Worship* and that *Manner* of it, which will in itself be acceptable to him, are *Deductions* which can be made *only* from previous discoveries of the Existence, and of the Nature of God. As to his Existence, that there was a governing powerful *Principle* or *Principles*, they seem to have had a Knowledge, and rightly argued, that *he* or *they* were to be worshipped. But then, as to the *divine Nature*, that it was absolutely *one*, that it was strictly *Spiritual*, infinitely removed from all *material Conjunctions*, &c. they knew not; and therefore could not, by *any Use*, or Application of Reason in these Circumstances, establish a Worship *suitable* to the Perfections of such a Being: Since that is a Conclusion to be derived *only* from a presupposed Knowledge of these Perfections, according to all the *possible* Means of regular Illustration: As much as the Capacity of demonstrating the several Properties and Affections, which arise from the different Sections of a *Cone*, does necessarily presuppose just Conceptions of that solid Figure itself, which we call a *Cone*. But just Conceptions of God's *Unity, Spirituality, &c.* they

they had not, and therefore as his *Lordship*, according to the strictest Rules of *Logick*, concludes, “these Corruptions in Worship, &c. were not owing to an *undue Use* of their Reason”. For as Mr. *Locke*\* speaks the common Sentiment of Mankind, *Does the Mind regulate itself and its Assent by Ideas it never had? or the Understanding draw Conclusions from Principles, which it never yet knew or understood?*

In truth, human Reason was so little capable of searching out, and settling Notions about the *true Nature of God*, that *Tully*, speaking in his own Person, says, “+ There is no one thing, concerning which not only the Unlearned, but the Learned, do so much differ; whose Opinions, when they are so various, and disagreeing among themselves, it may so happen truly, that *not* one of them may be true, but it cannot be *that more than one shall be true.*” And the two Notions which *Grotius* thinks necessary || to establish either the *true* or a *false Religion*, are, 1st. “That there is a Deity (suppose one or more.) 2dly. That he takes care of human Affairs.”— Other Notions, he adds, are not equally evident, as that there are not *more Gods than one*; “that

\* *Locke's Human Underst.* L. 1. c. 4. §. 3.

+ Res enim nulla est de qua tantopere non solum indocti sed etiam docti dissentiant. Quorum opiniones cum tam variæ sint, tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum fieri profecto potest, ut earum nulla; alterum certe non potest ut plus una vera sit. *De Nat. Deor.* L. 1. §. 2.

|| Hæ notiones, numen aliquod esse, (unum an plura suppono) & curari ab eo res hominum, maximè sunt universales, & ad religionem sive veram sive falsam constituant omniō necessariae. *Grot. de Jure Bell.* I. 2. c. 20. §. 46. — Cæteræ notiones non sunt æque Evidentes, ut Deos plures uno non esse: nihil eorum quæ videmus Deum esse non mundum, non cœlum, non solem, non aerem: mundum non esse ab omni æternitate, ac ne ejus quidem materia sed à Deo facta.

Itaque

" that none of those Things we see, that the  
 " *World, the Heavens, the Sun, the Air,* is not  
 " God; that the World, or at least the Matter  
 " of it, is not *eternal*, but was made by God.  
 " And therefore we see the Knowledge of these  
 " Things, in Process of Time, obliterated, and,  
 " as it were, *extinct* among many People; and  
 " so much the easier, because the Laws took less  
 " care of these Particulars, it being possible that  
 " some sort of Religion might subsist without  
 " them."

This was the Opinion of that *great* Man, on a Review of those *true* Notions of God; which, as his *Lordship* has done, he also derived from Revelation; and to this spreading Defect of Knowledge, he very justly, as his \* *Lordship* also does, attributes the *Divine* Forbearance to the World in general. If therefore you will not allow the *Bishop* to have read *Grotius*, you must to your greater Mortification own, that it is a very strong Argument of the Truth, that two so *great* Men should, at such Distances of Time, fall into so near a Resemblance, or rather Identity of Thought on the same Subject, and differ so little in the Manner of treating it.

Hitherto I have had Regard only to that Decision of the Question, which must follow an impartial Consideration of the Arguments on both Sides. But if we consider the *Consequences* of those different Opinions, to repeat one of your own declamatory Passages, " No Man can  
 " look on yours without Horror and Detestati-

Itaque harum cognitionem temporum lapsu apud multos populos oblitteratam & quasi extictam videmus, eoque facilius quia leges hanc partem minus curabant, ut finè qua aliqua saltem confitere religio posset. *Ibid.* §. 47.

\* Past. Lett. p. 46.

" on,

"on, &c." For our Hypothesis being raised on a charitable Foundation, what human Reason did not discover in a Course of so many Years, that we charitably conceive it could not discover, especially since so many great Men, after their utmost Application that way, failed of Success; and from this Incapacity we conclude, their best Endeavours being supposed, as his *Lordship* speaks, that \* "God will not punish them for invincible Ignorance; and that they cannot fail to be mercifully dealt with by infinite Justice and Goodness". Whereas you, contrary to all Experience, and the universal Testimony of History, both Divine and Human, will suppose, from the inflexible hardness of your Heart, that they were capable of discovering these Truths; and in Consequence of that Supposition, you must pass a Judgment very terrible and shocking to Men of the least Charity or Compassion; viz. that they will receive proportionable Degrees of Condemnation, for not reducing this Capacity into correspondent Acts. Since what our Saviour says, " † That the Servant who knew his Lord's Will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his Will, shall be beaten with many Stripes." The Equity of which Sentence, that you may have no Objection to it, is grounded on this known Principle of Reason, that to whom Men have committed much, of them they will ask the more. What can the worst of Beings wish for more, than the Execution of your Hypothesis?

But to go on, his *Lordship* says, || " That the Design of the Christian Institution was not to force Men to be good, but only to propose fit

† Past. Lett. p. 46.    † Luke xii. 47.    || Past. Lett. p. 38.  
" Motives

“ Motives, and proper Encouragements and As-  
 “ sistances to make them so; and our Saviour  
 “ himself supposes, that in his Kingdom here up-  
 “ on Earth, there will always be † Tares grow-  
 “ ing up with the Wheat (a *Mixture* of good  
 “ and bad) ’till he himself shall make the *final*  
 “ Separation. Though his Kingdom is not *of*  
 “ this World, it is *in* it; and it is a very unfair  
 “ Inference, that because Wickedness is found in  
 “ Christian Countries, therefore Christianity has  
 “ failed of its End.”

Was I not in my Nature more inclined to  
 Compassion, than the other more turbulent Emo-  
 tions of Spirit, I should heartily envy you those  
 Transports, and that Excess of Pleasure, with  
 which *this* Topick overspreads your Soul. Down  
 comes the Grand || *Accuser of the Brethren*:  
 The voluminous *Common-Place-Book*.

*Scriptus & in tergo, necdum finitus.*

The Enrollments are laid open from the Days  
 of *Iscariot*, to the present Times; Facts are col-  
 lated, their Nature examined, and a Balance  
 struck much in Favour of your beloved *Heathens*:  
 Though some Things are not only, as you allow,  
 † *almost too gross to be mentioned* (nothing I find  
 being quite too gross with you) but as I must  
 ever think *much too gross* to be at *any Time* practised;  
 and I wonder why any one who has so perfect a  
 Command of his Belief in such *incredible filthy*  
*Absurdities*, should ever find a Difficulty of Af-  
 sent in any other Matters. But as his *Lordship*  
 has, by way of *Anticipation*, most truly observed,  
 to prove that “there are Tares among the Wheat,  
 “ will never prove that Christianity has failed of  
 “ its End,” any more than that almost *universal*

† Matt. xiii. 24.    || Rev. xii. 4.    † Addr. p. 38.

Apo-

Apostacy foretold, *Rev.* xiii. I shall therefore avoid examining the Particulars of your Account, since in Truth they do not affect, in the least, the right State of the Case: Which is briefly this:

The Men of Learning among the *Heathens*, could not discover the Original Truth of Things, but in many Cases misled the Ignorant; and the Tenets and Practices of both, considered in this View, proceeding from the natural Defects of human Reason, or their *Inability* to discover Truth, do necessarily shew, that mere Reason was an insufficient Guide. But on the other Side, Revelation has discovered to Men the genuine Truth of Things, both in regard to *Speculation* and *Practice*. And therefore, tho' many Men, to whom this Revelation has been made, do maintain erroneous Doctrines, and follow evil Practices; this is no more a Proof of the Insufficiency of Revelation, as a Guide, than that there are some Men who love *Darkness* more than *Light*, or who will not come unto the *Light*, is a Proof that the *Sun* never shone upon the Earth. For the Sufficiency of the Guide we now look after, precisely considered, lies in the Communication of sufficient Knowledge, which was wanting in the Heathen World, and is fully given to the Christian. An Heathen then may plead in Excuse a *Defect* of Knowledge, and so transfer the Blame from himself to his Guide; but as a wicked *Christian* cannot urge this Defence, his Sin will be on himself, and his Law shall be clear. For unless you know how to make those Guides in all Respects the same, one of which affords a perfect Knowledge of Duty, while the other gives a very defective Knowledge of it: Unless, I say, you

H can

can prove this, all other Attempts are manifestly besides the Question.

The \* last Objection you make to any Thing contained under this second Head of the *Pastoral Letter*, is to this Passage. “ It is universally true, “ that wherever Christianity prevailed, Oracles “ ceased, Idols were destroy’d, and the Worship “ of the true God establish’d.” A Consideration of the very Terms in which this Truth is delivered, will easily shew, that whatever is opposed to it must be perfect Cavil. For how can the *Christian Religion*, which is the Worship of the true God, prevail where that Worship is not establish’d? And does not the Establishment of the true as necessarily infer a Destruction of *Idolatrous Worship*, as the Reception of one Truth does the Removal of its contradictory? And if *Idols* were destroy’d, the *Oracles* which proceeded from them must be so. I proceed to the third Head of the *Pastoral Letter*; viz.

+ *A Divine Revelation was not only Expedient, but highly Needful to be a sure Guide in Matters of Religion.* All the Objections you make to any Thing contain’d under this Head, are to the Quotations his Lordship has taken from *Tully* and *Plato*. || *What he mentions from Tully, you say, makes directly against him; where Tully says, “ There are in our Minds the Seeds of Virtue, “ by which Nature would conduct us to Happiness, if they were allow’d to grow up.” Here, even by your own Account, the Usefulness of these Seeds of Virtue depends entirely on their being allow’d to grow up;* and to shew that they were not “ allow’d to grow up,” or consequent-

\* Addr. p. 100.      + Past. Lett. p. 38, 39.      || Addr. p. 96.

ly to be useful, take what the *Bishop* ‡ cites from *Tully*. The Original is placed at the bottom of the Page: || “ If Nature had so framed us, as to “ give us a full and perfect View of her, and an “ Ability to follow her as our Guide, then Man- “ kind would have needed no other Teacher: “ But now the Light she has given us, is no “ more than little Sparks, which we quickly ex- “ tinguish by corrupt Lives, and perverse Opin- “ ions; so that the *true* Light of Nature is no “ where to be found.” And then he goes on and says, \* “ There are in our Minds the Seeds “ of Virtue, by which Nature would conduct “ us to Happiness, if they were allowed to grow “ up; but now no sooner are we born, but we “ fall into a wretched Depravity and Corruption “ of Manners and Opinions.”

Whatever abstract metaphysical Notion, *Tully* himself might have of what he calls *Nature*, it is from hence manifest, that he gives up all Advantages that might be expected from the *Use* of it, in the Conduct of human Life, by saying, that “ we “ could not have a full and perfect View of her;” that “ her little Sparks were quickly extin- “ guish’d,” and “ that the true Light of Na- “ ture was no where to be found.” On which Account your Labours to shew that none could

‡ *Past. Lett.* p. 40.

|| *Quod si tales nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri, & perspicere, eademque optimâ duce cursum vitæ confidere possemus, haud erat fane quod quisquam rationem ac Doctrinam requireret: nunc parvulos nobis dedit Igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravatis sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturæ lumen appareat.* *Tuse. Quæst. L. 3. Præf.*

\* *Sunt enim ingeniosis nostris semina innata virtutum, quæ si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduce-ret; nunc autem simul atque editi in lucem & suscep-ti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate, & in summa opinionum perver-sitate versamur.* *ib.*

\* err who follow'd Nature, however true it may seem in some Mens Imaginations, will never prove of any *Use* to the World, as not being reducible into *Practice*; since it is agreed, that we cannot come at such a Knowledge of *Nature*, as is necessary to carry on the Government of Life, unless you are pleased to say, a Man may walk by a *Light* which is *no where to be found*. In short, *Nature* and *Philosophy*, were the two great Fountains of Knowledge in the Heathen World. But his *Lordship* has fully shewn the Inability of *Philosophy*, to be a sufficient Guide in the foregoing Pages; and if what is defective *there* cannot be supplied by *Nature*, there is then a *total Insufficiency*, which makes the Argument compleat. But,

The *Bishop* has said, || “ We find two of the greatest Philosophers, *Socrates* and *Plato*, despairing of the Recovery of Mankind out of a State of Error and Corruption, without some extraordinary Assistance from God. *Socrates* speaking to the *Athenians* of himself, tells them, ‘ That † when he is gone, they will fall into an irrecoverable State, unless God shall take care of them, and send them another *Instructor*. And || *Plato*, speaking of the wrong Methods of Education among the *Athenians*, says, *That in such a State of Things, whatever is kept right and as it ought to be, must be effected by a Divine Interposition.* And elsewhere he introduces one of the Scholars of *Socrates* complaining how difficult it is to discover the Truth by Human Reason; but yet acknowledging it to be every ones Duty to employ, and to rely upon it, un-

\* Addr. p. 97. || Paft. Lett. p. 41. † Plat. Apolog. Socrat.  
|| De Repub. lib. 6.

“ less

less \* one could find some more sure and safe Pilot,  
“ such as a Divine Direction would be.”

In Opposition to this, you say, that † Socrates is so far from speaking of himself as an Instructor sent from God; and that he as such had preserved them from falling into an irrecoverable State; that he supposes their Crime was, that they would not make use of their own Reason in relation to him, but acted as Men asleep, and wanted to be awaken'd. His Words are, Quanquam vos quidem fortasse indignabundi, &c. And Plato, you add, speaking of one who has a good Disposition and a right Education, supposes he may arrive ad Fastidium (I suppose you mean Fastigium) Bonitatis: Then says, Quod si neque rectè fata, &c.— And what this Writer quotes from Socrates's Scholar is as little to the Purpose.

Believe me, Mr. Addresser, there cannot be a greater Fatigue in the Ways of Writing, than to pursue an Author, who with fearless Confidence now disguises and denies the plainest Truths, now propounds and defends as manifest Deviations from them. But my Design being to follow you thro' every Passage you have attacked in this *Pastoral Letter*, I must in Justice to his Lordship here transcribe the very Places he refers to. And first,

In his *Apology* Socrates speaks thus: ‡ “ And now, O ye Athenians, I am so far from endeavouring an Apology for my self (as any one

\* Plat. Phæd. † Addr. p. 96.

‡ Νῦν δέ, ὁ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πόλες δέω ἔγα τοσφέροις ἐμαντίζει πολογεῖσθε (ἢ πε τὸν σύνοικον) ἀλλά τοσφέροις, μη δέ αμφεπτῆτε ποτὲ τὴν τοσφέροις σύνοικον ὑμῖν, ἐμοὶ καταψοιοισινδροι. Εάν γὰρ με ποτολείνυτε, καὶ βασίως ἄλλον ποιεῖτον δέριστε, αὐτεκνῶς (εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν) περιστείμενον τῇ πόλει τοσφέροις τὴν τοσφέροις ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γυναικί, τοσφέροις μεγάλῃς τῇ ναυαρτερέσφ, καὶ δεομέδῳ ἐγείρεασθε τοσφέροις μύστης τηνθ. Οἵου δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὃ τοσφέροις ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει περιστείμενοι ποιεῖτον πίγα. Plat. Apol. Socr. Sect. 12.

“ would

" would imagine) that it is for you; lest in condemning me, you should act wickedly in relation to the *Gift given you by God*. For if you cut me off, you will not easily find such another, (altho' this may seem somewhat pleasant) \*manifestly set over this City by God; as over a great and generous Horse, heavy by reason of his Bulk, and wanting to be roused by some Horse-Fly. Such an one as God, I think, has given me to be to this City, &c." Afterward follows what you have very learnedly given us, from the *Latin Word of Plato*; in the End of which, the Truth has unawares dropp'd from your Pen. *You Athenians will sleep on, unless God, taking care of you, should send somebody else.* Secondly,

Those bad Methods of Education, which his *Lordship* mentions among the *Athenians*, had so prevailed, and the *Sophists* or *Teachers* were arrived at such an Height of Power, that in *Plato's Opinion* it was Madness to endeavour either to rectify or oppose them. " † But it is great Mad-nels, says he, to endeavour (any Reformation); for there neither is, or was, or ever will be any other Method taught for the Attainment of Virtue, besides this their Institution; I mean, my Friend, any *human* Method. A divine Method, as they say, I do not now bring into the Account: For you ought well

\* Περσκεψας, apponor, addor; περσιδημα. Plat. in Apol. Περσκεψας τη πόλει ψω τη θεο. Sum à Deo civitati adhibitus, i. e. præfectorus. Const. in voc. περσκεψας.

† Ἄλλα καὶ τὸ διπλοῦν πελλὶ ἀρισταῖς τῷ γένει, τῷ τε γένεν, εἰδὲ τὸ μὴ γένει ἄλλοιον θεοῦ περσεψας ἀριστήν, τοῦτο τὸ πατέραν πεπαισθείσθρον ἀνθρώπον, ὃς ἔταιρε. Θεῖον μέντοι, κατὰ τὸ παρειμένα, ἐξαιρώ λόγυς· ἐν τῷ γένει εἰδίνου ὁ πὲρ ἄν σωθῆ τε καὶ γένει θεον δεῖ, εἰ τοιάντη καταστάσει πολιτεῶν θεῖον μοῖραν αὐτὸν (Ἄσται λέγων εἰ κακὸς ἔρεις. Plat. de Rel. l. 6. p. 492, 493.

“ to comprehend, that you would not speak  
 “ wrong, in saying, That the *divine Providence*  
 “ does preserve whatever is preserved, and made  
 “ as it *should be*, in this State of the Common-  
 “ wealth.”

The only remaining Passage is this, where *Socrates's Scholar* says, — “ \* If this is im-  
 “ possible (*viz.* to find out the real Truth of  
 “ Things) then a Man of Courage ought to take  
 “ the best and safest Determinations of human  
 “ Reason; and being carried on this, as on a † *Ship*  
 “ *made in haste to serve a present purpose*, to sail  
 “ out Life at all Hazards; unless he could pass  
 “ thro' with more Safety and less Danger on some  
 “ more firm Bottom, or *divine Direction.*”

If the true Import of the Word *χρίσια*, could have found a place among your Ideas, it must have convey'd the clearest Impression imaginable, that *Human Reason* was an Assistance they made use of, as we say in common *English*, *for a Shift*. But I know some Men have suggested, that your Intimacy with that Language, is not so great as should become a Man, who enters into Controversies of this nature. I own my self fearful of speaking on a Point so tender: For what an endless load of *Scandal*, *Reproach* and *Falshood* have the overflowings of your Heart bestowed on the *Author of Scripture Vindicated*, for barely looking this way. In Compliment to your Abilities, I must freely acknowledge, I never saw

\* Ἐταῦτα εἰδωστον, οὐ γάρ βέλπουν τὸν θρωπίνων λόγον λαβόντα καὶ δυσκελεύσατον, ὅπερ τέττα ὁχύμων, ὥσπερ ὅπερ χρεῖαν κινδυνεύοντα διαπλῶσαι τὸ Λειόν. Ἐτι μὴ περιναυτοῦ ἀσφαλέστερον, καὶ ακινδυνότερον ὅπερ βεβαιοτέρη ὁχύμων οὗ λόγος θεία πνὸς διαπεράθλωσαι. Plat. Phaed. Sect. 23.

† Σκεψία μηρὰ νᾶν, οὐ ξύλα ἢ Κυανέας καὶ ὡς πλένεται.  
Hesych.

such

such an Heap of *personal Abuse* and *Ribaldry* brought together in any Controversy ; and tho' I blame your Conduct, I think your political Views are not ill directed ; for could you change the Field of Battel, by provoking your Adversary to retaliate *in kind*, and once get him into the Kennel, all the World would soon admire your *vast Superiority* in flinging *Dirt*, as much as they now do his, in *Learning* and *Rational Discourse*. But in his Hands I leave you, and if I mistake not, I cannot wish you in *safer*. And, having evidently proved, by producing the *Authorities themselves*, that his *Lordship* has in *all* of them given us the *true and unquestionable Sense*, I shall now consider the *Fourth Head of this Letter*, viz.

*Fourthly, That Mankind are obliged to enquire, whether any Revelation has been made, and what Evidences there are of its coming from God.*

Here you say, that, \* where-ever Men are obliged to enquire, they must see sufficient Reason for that Enquiry ; and in this Case, they must have Reasons previous to any external Revelation, to induce them to enquire whether God has made any such Revelation ; otherwise this Enquiry would be wholly unreasonable. Who would not imagine from this extraordinary Reasoning of yours to prove, " That an Enquiry made without Reason would be unreasonable", that the *Bishop* had omitted to assign any Causes of this our Obligation to enquire, whether any Revelation, &c. has been made ? Whereas you must know that the Contrary is true, and that his *Lordship* has proved an Obligation in a close Series of Arguments ; as † " if we are God's Creatures, Duties of Wor-

\* Addr. p. 78.      † Past. Lett. p. 42, 43.

" ship,

" ship, &c. arise from that Relation; if dependent, we stand in need of Protection, and the Means of obtaining it; if a divine Providence, we must desire to know the Methods of it; if a Future State, what Behaviour will secure Happiness. And of all these, his *Lordship* says, there can be no Knowledge or Assurance equal to that which God himself gives. So that while Men out of a Zeal for what they call Natural Religion, are *unconcerned* whether God has made any Revelation of his Will or not, they violate the Laws of Nature in a double Respect; First by resisting that natural *Impression* which has always carried Men to enquire after the Declarations of God's Will; and then, by an obstinate unconcernedness for their own Safety and Welfare, contrary to the great and fundamental Law of Nature, Self-Preservation.

By this Time, I hope you see, that his *Lordship* has given sufficient Reasons for an *Enquiry* to be made; and I could wish this Instance might remain a little on your Mind, as a Remembrancer of that *unfair Treatment*, with which you misrepresent the Works of those you write against. But from page 78 of your *Address*, I must return to the 5th, where you say, the *Pastoral Letter-Writer goes on still to arraign the Conduct of God*; and says, " \* It was very agreeable to the natural Notions we have of the divine Goodness and Wisdom, to suppose that he would make a farther Revelation to Mankind, which might give a clearer Knowledge, and a stronger Sense of Duty, unless we will suppose that he had utterly abandon'd them". Which

\* *Past. Lett. p. 44.*

is owning, that God, for four thousand Years together, had utterly abandon'd Mankind; and still continues to abandon the greatest part of them, to this very Day; and that this is agreeable to the natural Notions we have of the divine Wisdom and Goodness: These sure are Expressions so shocking, &c.

Had it been your good Fortune, Mr. Addresser, to have known the very first Rudiments of Logick; you must have easily perceived, that the word *Mankind* is not here used by his Lordship in a Sense strictly *universal*, but \* *collectively*; as denoting the *united Generations* of Men, from the Fall to the End of the World; and in this view, as the Word which expresses it is an *individual*, so the Subject also itself makes but *one single Idea*, of which Nature are things of more extent, as the Solar System and the Universe, whose several constituent Parts do not at all affect the † *Unity* of the Idea. And

The Argument, made use of to prove, that God would make a Revelation, is in that *disjunctive* Form, where the Members are so opposite, that they cannot consist together; and explicitly run thus. “ God will give Mankind a clearer Knowledge, and a stronger Sense of Duty; or, “ he has utterly abandon'd them. But God cannot “ utterly abandon them. *Ergo*. From the Force of this Reasoning we *must* allow a Revelation to be made, at some time or other, when the *divine* Wisdom should judge most proper, or else admit a *moral Impossibility*. So that in reality, these natural Notions, which did suppose that God would reveal his Will; did necessarily suppose (though you are willing to think the contrary) that he had not *utterly abandon'd them*.

\* *Wallis Log.* I. 1, c. 3. † *Locke Hum. Und.* I. 2. c. 24.

Here is nothing affirm'd of the state of particular Men, *separately taken*, which could not be intended, where the word *Mankind* signified but *one single collective Idea*. And in the Nature and Use of such *collective individual Terms*, does St. Paul found his Arguments, when in Reference to the State of the *Jewish* People before *Christ*, and the use of the Law of *Moses*, he says; *But before Faith came, we were kept under the Law, shut up unto the Faith, that we might be justified by Faith. Wherefore the Law was our Schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by Faith.* Gal. iii. 23, 24. where the Learned Grotius has this Note. \* "There are says he, "among People, different + Stages of Life, as "well as among single Men, as Florus shews us. "The Stage of Life of the *Israelitish* People under the Law, was as it were *Childhood*: See "chap. iv. 1. to wit, that Age to which a "Schoolmaster or Tutor, as Horace speaks, a "Keeper, Gen. iv. 9. is generally given, who "should preserve them from more heinous Transgressions. This the Law did to that People, "and had it not been given, they would have "fallen into such Impieties, as to have been "Deaf to the Voice of the Gospel".

Here then you see St. Paul, and from him Grotius,

\* Sunt ut hominum ita & Populorum ætates, ut Florus ostendit. Ætas Israelitici populi sub Lege erat quasi Pueritia. Infra, c. iv. 1. nempe illa cui addi solet *ταῦτα γενῶνται*, sive custos, ut Horat. loquitur, *חַמְלָא* Gen. iv. 9. qui eos a gravioribus delictis retrahat. Hoc officium Lex illi populo præsttit, quod ni fuisset prolapsi fuissent ad tantam impietatem per quam obsurduissent ad vocem Evangelii. Grot. in Loc.

+ I have translated Ætas, different Stages in Life, from the use of that Word in Horace's Art. Poet. v. 156.

Ætatis cuiusq; notandi sunt tibi Mores,  
Mobilibusq; decus naturis dandus, & annis.

compounding all the Generations of the *Jewish* People, from the giving of the Law to the Coming of Christ, into one single Idea of an individual, as his *Lordship* has Mankind in general. And All of them have acted according to the stated use of Words, received among Men of any pretence to Learning. In the same manner of Speaking are whole Nations, and sometimes the whole *World*, made the Subject of prophetical Discourses. For that God had not utterly abandoned Mankind separately taken, or universally, the History of the Old Testament, of which I hope you will allow his *Lordship* to be a Believer, may abundantly convince.

In your next Attack, the Misrepresentation is so visible, that I believe none but *your self* would have ever ventur'd on it. You take a Passage from *Past. Lett.* p. 47, where his *Lordship* is answering this Question; "Why a Revelation was "not made to every Person, at least to every "Age?" and then produce another Passage from p. 44. where he is refuting an Objection of a very different Nature, *viz.* "Why such a Guide "was not given at first, as might have excluded "the Need of a future Revelation?" and then triumphantly, tho' very falsely assert, that the latter Passage, notwithstanding its being three Pages before, and entirely on another Subject, was design'd as a Proof of the former. If this be acting according to the Laws of Reason, Truth, or Honour, to use your own Dialect, God deliver me from them all.

The whole, as you have placed it, stands thus:  
 " \* He (the Bishop) says, A Rule of Duty is one  
 " and the same to all Persons, and in all Ages;  
 " and when a standing Test is once given to di-  
     stingueh

\* Add. p. 76.

" distinguish Truth, it is equally a Test at all Times  
 " and in all Places, supposing it to be convey'd  
 " to them with sufficient Evidence of its coming  
 " from God. This is the Case of the Gospel  
 " Revelation." To this you say; *If there was*  
*no standing Rule or Test to distinguish Truth from*  
*Error till the Time of the Gospel, Men till then*  
*could not be moral Agents, or, for want of a stand-*  
*ing Rule to govern their Actions, be accountable for*  
*them.* If this be orthodox Divinity, God deliver  
 me from Orthodoxy. To prove this Orthodox Par-  
 adox, he says: "They who think it had been  
 " most agreeable to the Divine Wisdom and  
 " Goodness, to have given Mankind one certain  
 " Rule from the Beginning, which should have  
 " been a sufficient Guide to all future Genera-  
 " tions; and that the Need of a new Revelation  
 " implies a want of Knowledge and Foresight in  
 " God, seem to forget that Man was created a  
 " Free Agent, and as such must have it in his  
 " Power to fall into a State of Degeneracy and  
 " Corruption." But does not this State suppose a  
 standing Rule for Men to have guided their Actions  
 by? Where there is no Rule, there can be no Devi-  
 ation from a Rule; no Degeneracy or Corruption;  
 and Men being free Agents, had it in their Power  
 to come out of that State.

In order to replace Things in their true Light,  
 I must observe, that the first Passage you have  
 here cited, being to remove a particular Objecti-  
 on, is thus introduced: "No less unreasonable  
 " are they, who plead that if a Revelation is to  
 " be regarded, it ought to be made to every Per-  
 " son, at least to every Age: For a Rule of Duty  
 " is one and the same, &c." The whole Design  
 of that Place being only to prove, that an actual  
 Repetition of the Gospel Evidence is not neces-  
 sary

sary to every *Man*, or every *Age*. But to suppose that your Objections were not foreign to the Purpose, if the Gospel is *now* a standing and universal Test, does it therefore follow, that there neither was, or is, any *other* Criterion in the World, tho' of *less* Extent, yet useful enough, as far as it could extend?

What his *Lordship* says in the other Passage, you have also perverted; which being an Answer to a special Objection, ought to be considered in that View. Now the Objector imagines, that God should have given at first a Guide of such unalterable Sufficiency, as would have for ever excluded the *Need* of a *new* Revelation. The Dispute then is not, as you pretend to think, whether *any* Rule was given, but whether a Rule of *such* Sufficiency as is here specified *should* have been given, as agreeable to the *divine* Wisdom. Now the first Rule being committed to the *Memories* of Mankind; and *Man*, as his *Lordship* observes, being created a *free* Agent, *must* have it in his *Power* to fall and to forget; and yet nothing in all this disagreeable to our Notions of the *divine* Wisdom, which put it in their Power to *know*, and to *practise*. In a word, Men were put to their Trial; they miscarried, they are relieved; a written Law not being liable to the same kinds of Corruption and Defects, as one that is oral and unwritten. And so much as to that *particular* Sufficiency of the Rule, which had been one secure Means of its Continuance; and what we find practised by *Moses*, who was *faithful in all his House, as a Servant*, and afterward by *Christ as a Son over his own House, whose House we are*, Heb. iii. 5, 6.

But

But this Writer, you say, + Though he ransacks all the Corners of the Earth, to discover what unreasonable Things Men have been guilty of, in order to prove how insufficient Reason is to answer the End for which God gave it; yet from the Reason of Things he is forced to own the unreasonableness of that Supposition, in saying, " if \* indeed it appears'd that God would judge Men for the Transgression of any Duty which they did not and could not know to be their Duty, and that he would make them accountable for not being influenced by Motives which he had never acquainted them with; it would be difficult to reconcile such a Proceeding to the divine Justice. But since the contrary to this is true, and it is certain God will not punish Men for invincible Ignorance; surely he is at Liberty to dispense extraordinary Favours at what Times, and in what Measures, to what Nations, and to what Persons he thinks fit; and there can be no doubt but such Persons and Nations are bound to receive them with all the Gratitude and Thankfulness that is due from Creatures to their Creator. Are we then to quarrel with God, that he raises us to greater Degrees of Perfection, in order to advance us to greater Degrees of Happiness and Glory? Can there be a more flagrant Instance of Perverseness, than to refuse his Favours for the very Reason which ought to increase our Thankfulness for them; namely, that he vouchsafes them to *us*, and not to others." But is it not a flagrant Instance of Perverseness, and a high degree of Ill-Nature, to suppose it ought to increase our Thankfulness for Favours, because God has not

† Addr. p. 10, 11.

\* Past. Lett. p. 46, 47.  
vouch-

vouchsafed them to others? A good-natured Man would think his Happiness increased, by seeing others as happy; and would praise and adore the impartial and universal Goodness of the divine Being; and in Imitation of him, endeavour to communicate Happiness to as many as possible.

I should be glad to hear how the *Bishop*, as you pretend, owns the Unreasonableness of this Supposition, that *Reason is an insufficient Guide, &c.* when the whole you here refer to, amounts barely to this, That those charitable Hopes we entertain of their Condition, are all taken from their invincible Ignorance, and God's *Mercy*: The Argument must run in this Form: Ignorance of Duties, if invincible, will be pardon'd; therefore, the Reason of Men thus ignorant, was sufficient to have informed them of these Duties. This is the only Method of proving your Imputation, from any thing his *Lordship* has laid down, and is so like *your own*, that I am sure you will be pleased with it.

Those Instances of universal Corruption which the *Bishop* has given from a collected View of the past and present State of Things, are very sufficient to support that general Truth, which his *Lordship* design'd to infer from them, viz. That "Human Reason of itself was insufficient in Matters of Religion;" and yet, at the same time he acknowledges Reason, as "God gave it," like all his other Gifts, every way sufficient to "answer the End for which it was given." But you should consider, that Reason corrupted, impair'd, and darkned, is not Reason as God gave it. Where then is the injurious Treatment of the Divine Wisdom or Goodness, if we say, That God gave Man a Rule sufficient for the End proposed, but that he through Neglect, Impotence, and

and Wickedness, has made it insufficient; and that notwithstanding this acquired Insufficiency, it is still the best he has, and that therefore he is obliged to use it as well as he can.

I must now look into and examine this Question in *general*, whether it ought to exercise our Thankfulness for Favours, that they are vouchfaffed to *us*, and not to *others*? Only premising, that it is the known Duty of every *Christian* to endeavour, and ought to be his daily Prayer, that God's Kingdom may come; and I believe these Prayers and Endeavours are continually used, and yet you must know, they are not effectual to the Conversion of every Man; so that to imagine any *Christian* pleased with the wretched State of Infidels, is to make him worse than an Infidel. This Cau-tion premised, I say, that *Thankfulness*, such as it ought to be, must consist precisely in entertaining just Notions of, and endeavouring to make suitable Returns, to *beneficial Love*. But that Love cannot be truly *beneficial*, as it terminates in bestowing Favours, which does not make a less or greater Change in our present State, from the worse to the better. So that the *Difficulties* we are removed from, do as necessarily tend to constitute a *true Idea* of *Thankfulness*, as the *Conveniences* to which we are advanced. If then the Difficulties of our former State were common to a great many, and those our Friends, and some few of this Number only should have the Happiness to be released from them, I allow the *Misery* of our Friends would be a Thought of *Grief*, whenever it occurr'd: But as this Happiness, which is supposed to proceed merely from the *Favour* and *Love* of our Benefactor, was by way of an *extraordinary Distinction* conferr'd on us, it does evidently

shew a higher Degree of beneficial Love *to us*, and from thence must increase *our Thankfulness*, or it will fall very short of that true Proportion in which the *just Idea* of it has been shewn to consist. Neither

Is this Distinction any ways owing to Revelation, but, what I know will please you, manifest from the Light of Nature; into which a *Roman Author* look'd farther, than I find *some* of his Disciples have Eyes to follow him.

*Suave mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis  
E Terra magnum alterius spectare laborem;  
Non quia vexari quenquam est jucunda voluptas,  
Sed quibus ipse malis CAREAS quia cernere suave est.*

LUCR. l. 2.

The formal Cause of this Pleasure arises entirely from the View and Consideration of those Miseries *we ourselves* are exempt from; that *others* are distrefs'd, tho' it may prove an Occasion of placing our own Security in a stronger Light, is no Pleasure of *itself*, but the contrary, as this philosophizing Poet rightly distinguishes. I hope his Followers will not complain that this is *Authority*, and, as such, rather creates Silence than Conviction.

For my own part, there are few Blessings of Life, I conceive so high Degrees of Thankfulness for enjoying, as that it has pleased Providence to settle me in a *free State* and a *truly Christian Church*; and though none can more sincerely wish those unhappy Creatures, who bend down beneath the Tyranny of *arbitrary* and *idolatrous* Government, a Restitution of their religious and civil Liberties, yet a Knowledge of their Suffering, though most unpleasant

in

in *itself*, in this imperfect State adds a kind of new *Life* and *Resolution* to my Gratitude. The same I think, might be had from *mere abstract* Images of the Calamities naturally incident to a contrary Condition; but as long as we are Men, Realities will make deeper Impressions than Ideas barely mental. No one I believe walks through *Bedlam*, or visits an *Hospital*, who does not from the very Bent of Nature, thank God with *more than ordinary* Devotion, for the Blessings of a *sound Mind* in an *healthy Body*, however great his Compassion may be, or however fervent his Zeal for the Recovery of those *miserable Objects*.

On a distinct Review of the Question then, it appears that you know very little of human Nature or the *secret* Springs of moral Agency; and if his Lordship, who has look'd into the most *private* and *remote* Causes of it, and from thence traced them to their *open* and *visible Effects*, gives us a *just Account* of their Operations, you are weak enough to shew your Ignorance, by exclaiming against what you do not understand. I find *Ethicks* have robb'd you of no more Time, than *Logick* or the *Languages*.

I must now go on to the *fifth general Head*.

*Fifthly, It is the Duty of Mankind, to RECEIVE for their Guide whatever Revelation comes from God; and also to receive it WHOLE and ENTIRE.*

Having already discharged all your Objections to what might be inferr'd from this Position, you are obliged to \* bring a Passage of the *Pastoral Letter* from the *seventh general Head*, *Page 73*, and placing it immedately before one found in

\* Addr. p. 13.

the Thread of *this Discourse*, and taking just enough from each to fit your own Purpose, you then pretend to discover an Inconsistency. I must therefore transcribe the *whole*, and leave the Reader to judge which prevail'd most in this Instance, your Integrity or Judgment.

\* " Tho' " it is not in every Man's Power, his *Lordship* " says, to believe what he pleases; because as " Things appear at this or that Time to his Un- " derstanding, so his Belief must be; and we can " neither be charged with Guilt, or be liable to " Punishment, for what we cannot help; yet in " searching after Truth, there are two Things " which are in our Power, the *Use* of our Fa- " culties, and the *due* and *impartial* *Use* of " them." And in regard to this *impartial* *Use* of them, namely, that we should not refuse to believe *Historical Facts*, because not *mathematically* demonstrated, or be so *partial*, as to give an Assent to the Histories of the *Cæsars*, and remain doubtful about the History of *Jesus Christ*, &c. His *Lordship* says, + " While I am shewing you the " Obligation you are under to *receive* the *Gospel* " Revelation, it will be necessary that I caution " you against *Scepticism*, or an unreasonable *Dif-* " *ficulty* in believing, and suspending [the Assent " of the Mind, after it has received the proper " Grounds of Conviction. Such Scepticks are " all they, who will not be content with those " sorts of Proofs which Things are capable of; " for Instance, will not believe Things done be- " fore their own Time, because they did not see " or hear them, &c." So that though our Be- " lief in general, must be determined, as Things " appear to our Understandings; yet in examining

\* Past. Lett. p. 73, 74.

+ Past. Lett. p. 50.

the

the *Grounds* of his Assent, a Man who has already received those Evidences that are in themselves *sufficient*, and the *only ones* the Nature of the Subject will admit, may from a *mistaken Notion*, that the Thing does require higher, and clearer Proofs, with-hold his Assent, and act very *unreasonably* in so doing. On which Account, a Caution against *this kind*, of *Scepticism* is not more judicious than necessary. Either keep your Ideas a little more *distinct*, Mr. *Addressee*, or cease to trouble those who do. We come now to the *sixth general Head*.

Sixthly, \**Such, and so many, are the Excellencies of the Gospel Revelation, that every wise and good Man must wish it to be true; whether we consider the Ends it proposes, or the Means for attaining those Ends.*

Under this Head his *Lordship* having very justly observed, “That the Rules of the Philosophers were many of them wisely calculated for the Good of human Society, and the Members of it in *this World*; but had by no means such a direct Tendency and Relation to the Spiritual Enjoyments of the *next*, as appears to be the general Aim and Tenor of the Rules of the *Gospel*:” He adds, “And as the Precepts of Christianity are Preparations for a Happiness of a very different Nature from that which any *worldly* Enjoyments afford, and have higher Views, and nobler Ends, than can be answered or attain’d by those of meer Morality: In these Respects it was necessary that the *Gospel* Precepts should be built upon higher Principles than those of Morality; and that they

\* *Past. Lett. p. 53.*

“ should

" should be of a more pure, refined, and exalted  
 " Nature, and enforced by higher and more no-  
 " ble Motives."

To this you object, \* If Moral Precepts are founded on the eternal Reason of Things, and can't be altered by God himself; and Precepts that are not moral (if there are any such) can only be founded on mere Will and Pleasure; to say, " it was necessary that the Gospel Precepts should be built on higher Principles than those of Morality, and that they should be of more pure, refined and exalted Nature," is making Things that have no Excellency, nor internal Marks of being the Will of God, but are at the best merely indifferent, to be of a more pure, refin'd and exalted Nature, and built on higher Principles than those God governs all his own Actions by, and requires all Mankind at all Times to govern all their Actions.

The plain Answer to this is, that you quite mistake the Subject, for that his Lordship is here speaking of mere Heathen Philosophical Morality, such as it appear'd in Fact imperfect and defective, and as chiefly confin'd to the Happiness of this Life; whereas you are talking of somewhat widely different, viz. that System of Morality founded on the eternal Nature of Things, by " which God governs all his own Actions," and which in its full Extent can therefore be known to him alone. And this Pastoral Letter has made it evident, to the Exclusion of all just Opposition, that this eternal Reason of Things, in which is laid the Foundation of all moral Precepts, was so little known, or so inaccurately understood, or so injudiciously applied by the Heathens, as to make some more perfect and certain

\* Addr. p. 54, 55.

**Rule of Duty necessary.** If then, in this more perfect Rule, higher Degrees of Happiness, and those of as different a Nature, as the Pleasures of an *earthly* and an *heavenly* Conversation are proposed; those Precepts which have these higher Views and nobler Ends in Prospect, *must* teach Duties of a Nature as much more pure, refined and exalted, than mere philosophical Moralists prescribed, as the Views of *Christianity* transcend those of *Philosophy*. To which Purpose I shall give you the Words of *Grotius*. \* "Certainly, " as we have said in other Places, it is not strange " that some Things which are *lawful* by Nature " and the Civil Laws, should be forbidden by " the *divine Law*; which is most perfect, and " promises a Reward *greater* than human Nature. " For the obtaining of which Reward, the Practice of such Virtues are most *justly* requir'd, as " exceed the mere *Precepts* of Nature."

And if the Difficulties of the *Christian* Warfare are hereby made greater, though in no Proportion to the promised Reward, our Motives to Obedience are also built upon higher Principles, such as his *Lordship* mentions in the *next Section*. *First*, A true Knowledge of the *Nature of God*. *Secondly*, His Love to us, in sending his own Son to die for us, &c. Whereas it is not only certain, as the *Apostle* says, that  $\dagger$  *the World by Wisdom knew not God*, or had just Apprehensions of his Nature; but that it was impossible for them,

\* Certe, ut alibi diximus, non mirum est, quædam, quæ naturâ & per leges civiles licent, vetari lege divinâ, eaque perfectissimâ & præmium promittente naturâ humâ majus: Ad quod Consequendum, non immerito virtutes requiruntur, quæ sola naturæ precepta excedant. *Grot. de jur. Bel. L. II. c. 20. 10. 1.*

$\dagger$  *I Cor. i. 21.*

by any Efforts of their Wisdom to discover the  
 \* Fellowship of the Mystery which from the begin-  
 ning of the World hath been hid in God, who crea-  
 ted all Things by Jesus Christ. And the true  
 Knowledge of God, not only as a Creator, but  
 as a Redeemer and Sanctifier, &c. are undoubtedly  
 higher Principles of Action, than can be erected  
 on a Denial or Ignorance of them. Neither can  
 I think any Man in his Senses will deny, that  
 † "the strongest Assurances of Rewards and Pu-  
 nishments in another World are infinitely  
 greater Enforcements than the Poetical Styx or  
*Elysium*. And to advance these plain Truths, is  
 the only Design of his Lordship's present Argu-  
 ment. For,

However pompously some Men may talk of  
 the Certainty of a future State, in order to wea-  
 ken the Necessity of Christianity, which affirms,  
 that the Gospel brought Life and Immortality to  
 Light; if we consider those two great Argu-  
 ments, the one taken from the natural Immortali-  
 ty of the Soul; and the other from the Inequali-  
 ties of this Life, they will never create an Assur-  
 ance equal to that of Revelation. For the Im-  
 materiality of the Soul, on which this Immorta-  
 lity is founded, has been so far from being de-  
 monstrated by the Strength of human Reason, to  
 the Conviction of all Men, that two of the  
 greatest Men of the present Age, the one for the  
 Knowledge of Books and Reading, the other for  
 the deepest and best cultivated Thought, Mr. Locke  
 and Mr. Dodwell, have professed themselves far  
 from Satisfaction in this Matter. For the Corner-  
 Stone of this Immateriality being laid in the  
 Power and Use of Thought, and Self-Consciousness,

\* Eph. iii. 9.

† Past. Lett. p. 56.

it is esteem'd to prove more than enough, in making the Souls of other Creatures, who have *Thought, &c.* immortal too; and if it be reply'd, that God may annihilate these Principles in them, though naturally immortal; why, says an *indolent* or a *wicked Man*, may not this Annihilation be extended to others also, and so *Futurity* have very little Influence on our Practice? Besides, who can certainly know what Powers the Almighty may communicate to mere Matter? The *immediate Instruments* of our Thoughts we know are such.

Again; The Inequalities of *this Life* can only demand a proportionable Recompence, which be it ever so *certain*, yet both its Greatness and Duration must be strictly regulated by the Measure of our Sufferings; which, if excessive, must be short, or if long, then tolerable: So that the expected Satisfaction cannot, according to any just Analogy, be of a *great Continuance*. Neither will the Force of this Argument extend itself to prove the Existence of *all Men* in another State, since it is grounded on the Supposition of *such Miseries* as are not the Lot of *all*, no not of *all good Men*; for Virtue, ordinarily speaking, has a natural Tendency to provide the Enjoyments even of this Life. As for the *many*, who dream on in a quiet animal State, the *Philosophers*, as well as the *Poets*, went no further than,

\

*Numerus sumus, & fruges consumere nati.*

From *this Topic* then it can never be shewn, that Men who have proved successful in their Pursuits and Pleasure, can have any Pretensions at all to a *future Existence*. Suppose that *Cato*

shall be rewarded, tho' we know not how long, or in what Manner; Yet what Inequalities, what Sufferings can be alledged by the *Cyrus of Xenophon?* And must the *Law*, the *Prophets*, and the *sure Mercies of the everlasting Gospel*, be set aside as needless, for Arguments liable to such Exceptions and Restraints?

Your next Charge runs thus: \* *This Writer, (the Bishop) if we may judge by what he says, supposes the Old and New Testament give such a Character of the Nature of God, as clash with one another. His Words are, + "Christianity gives us a true Knowledge of the Nature of God; that it is not impure, as the greatest part of the Heathens believed, nor yet severe and terrible, according to the general Tenor of the Jewish Dispensation, as given to a stiff-necked and obstinate People; but that he is a Being of a pure spiritual Nature, and is kind to us, and loves to do us good."* If the true Knowledge of the Nature of God, is the Foundation of all Religion; and if the Knowledge which the general Tenor of the Jewish Dispensation gives us of the Nature of God, is contrary to that which the Gospel gives, can both be true? Is not the Nature of God immutably and eternally the same? Will the Jews being a stiff-neck'd and obstinate People alter it? Is not this striking at the Authority of New as well as the Old Testament, since the New owns the divine Inspiration of the Old?

In reply to this, I grant the *true* Knowledge of the Nature of God, must be the Foundation of all *true* Religion; but I hope you will also grant, that *false* Religions may be without

\* Addr. p. 82, 83.      † Past. Lett. p. 53.

it,

it, and consequently that it is not the Foundation of *all* Religion. Secondly, I deny, that the Knowledge which the general Tenor of the *Jewish Dispensation* gives us of the Nature of God, is contrary to that which the *Gospel* gives; any more than a *higher* degree of Knowledge of the *same* Subject is contrary to a *lower* Degree, or a *more* explicit Account to one that is *less* so: Or that a Behaviour generally severe toward a *stiff-necked* and *obstinate* People, and one more kind and gentle to others of a *more tender* Disposition, are Contrarieties, or so much as Inequalities in a rational Being; but such Declarations of Wisdom and Free-will as the *different* State of the Subject makes necessary; and what in all human Governments, which are yet directed by rational Agents, is look'd on as the highest Perfection both of *parental* and *political* Administration.

So that the “Nature of God may be immutably and eternally the same”. All his Attributes, such as, *Eternity, Omnipresence, Infinity, Absolute Perfection, &c.* which belong to him by the necessity of a *self-existent* Nature; all these are in the strictest Sense immutable. But can any one, from considering them under this view, affirm, that the *Creation* of Mankind was a necessary effect of this *Immutability*? No, all these Perfections may, and must, be in the *supreme independent* Being, and yet that *Being* might never have been a *God to us*: The word *God*, bearing a *relative* Sense, and importing Government, from whence we call him *our God*; and in the Methods of carrying on this great Work, the *moral* Attributes of *Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, &c.* are to be considered, not as *abstract* and *undetermined* in the *divine* Mind, but as *Virtues*

*actively employ'd, and having the good of Mankind for their Object; and therefore they may vary their Measures of Action, as the Conditions of Mankind do vary.*

The essential Natures and Differences then of Things, and the most perfect Rule of Duty commensurate to them, may still remain the same, and be fully comprehended by the Understanding of our Almighty Governor. But if at the same Time, he has such a certain Knowledge of the Capacities and Dispositions of *any Part* of his Subjects (however these Capacities and Dispositions came to them) that they will neither receive or obey this *most perfect Rule*, What Method shall his Wisdom then take? Must he press that upon them, which they will neither understand or submit to, and so *totally frustrate* the End of Government, the *good of the Subject*? Or will he be satisfied with *lower Measures* of Obedience, adequate to their Capacities and Dispositions, in order to advance them to *higher Degrees* of Virtue, by a gradual and easy Method of Institution. *This human Reason teaches, and this the divine Reason practised.*

The Law was a *Schoolmaster* \* to bring Men unto *Christ*. And in pursuance of Wisdom thus directed, did our *Saviour* answer those, who were for making more haste in the Introduction of Discipline and Severity, than the Circumstances of Things would fairly admit. *No Man, saith he, + putteth a Piece of new Cloth into an old Garment, for that which is put in to fill it up, taketh from the Garment, and the Rent is made worse.* So the *Apostle*, || *I have fed you with Milk, and not with Meat, for hitherto ye were not able to bear*

\* Gal. iii.

+ Matth. ix. 16. || 1 Cor. xxxii.

it. Neither does any one charge that *Lawgiver's* Wisdom with *Inconstancy*, who own'd that he had not given the *best Laws*, but only the *best his People would bear.*

For the *Wisdom* of God, as well as his other *moral Attributes*, in his several Dispensations to Mankind, must be, as I said, consider'd *relatively*, where the Circumstances of the *Subject* make an essential part of the Consideration. The Idea is complex, and contains the infinite *Wisdom of God*, display'd in the Government of Mankind. And in this view, higher or lower Means of Knowledge, &c. being afforded, as *human Exigencies* did, or do require; these *Differences* no more affect the *Immutability* of his *Wisdom*, than Things done in *Time* do his *Eternity*, or than the *Diversity* of created Beings in various Times and Places, prove him to be *changeable* or *uncertain*. I hope therefore, you will now be pleased to allow, that the *Jews* being a *stiff-neck'd* and *obstinate People*, was, as his *Lordship* most truly alledges, a good Reason, to determine the *Wisdom* of our heavenly Father to *suit* a Dispensation to that Temper; since the *Wisdom* of a *Governor* does properly consist in adapting *Laws*, as far as may be, to the Powers and Capacities of *his People*. And this one of our present *Writers*, who seems to think all *Fruit forbidden*, that can't be pluck'd from the essential *Tree of Nature*, freely confesses. *This*, says he, *was the Case of the Jews of old*; *for as the particular Circumstances and Temper of that People required that a greater number and variety of positive Duties should be practised by them*, *than otherwise there would have been Occasion for*; so — But to proceed:

The *Bishop* having given us "under this sixth  
" general Head, a short View of the Christian  
" In-

" Institution, both in the Ends it proposes, and  
 " the Means for attaining those Ends", He adds,  
 " \* It appears in this view, that the Method which  
 " the Gospel lays down for our Salvation, is  
 " throughout a consistent and uniform Scheme,  
 " worthy of God, and contrived with the greatest  
 " Wisdom and Goodness, for the Comfort and  
 " Happiness of Man". But you demand, *How*  
*can be say* + " the Gospel contains throughout a  
 consistent and uniform Scheme," if there are  
 Things of so different a nature in it, as Things which  
 have, and Things which have not *Fitness, Expedi-*  
*ence, Reasonableness or Wisdom?* I mention this  
 only to shew the Propensity of your Genius to  
*Falsification*; for who ever thought, or where  
 has his *Lordship* said, that any Scheme could be  
 consistent, which contains Things which have,  
 and Things which have not Fitness, &c. That a  
 Revelation made by God, may contain in it  
 Positions, whose Expedience we cannot imme-  
 diately discover, by any internal Evidence arising  
 from the Terms of them, has been sufficiently  
 proved under the first general Head.

In this Place, the *Bishop* observes, || that  
 several of our most eminent Divines after the  
 Restoration, such as Dr. *Wilkins, Barrow, Tillotson,*  
*Scot*, set themselves to enlarge on the Impor-  
 tance of moral Duties, because " during the  
 " Times of the foregoing Confusion, many had  
 " laboured to persuade the People, that Faith  
 " was all, and Works nothing;" and adds,  
 " But those of them, who with the honest view  
 " I have mentioned, laboured the most zealously  
 " in that way, were at the same Time, as zealous  
 " to explain to the People the great Work of

\* *Past. Lett.* p. 68.    + *Addr.* p. 53.    || *Past. Lett.* p. 64.

" our

" our Redemption by *Jesus Christ*, as the Means  
" of Salvation, which God has appointed".  
And to support this judicious Observation, his  
*Lordship* alledges many Authorities from these  
*Authors*, with their proper References in the  
Margin.

Here I must own my self at a Loss, *Mr. Ad-dresser*, whether I shall most admire your unusual *Modesty* in not denying these Authorities, or that unhappy *Looseness* of Temper, which can give you leave to vilify the Memory of these *truly great and good Men*. You say; \* *Not to examine into this Matter at present, I think nothing can be more easy than to know when the Love of Truth obliges Clergymen to speak their fair Sentiments, and when Interest makes them to dissemble.* Whatever Authority Men may have when they speak against their Interest, they certainly have none when either they must have starved, or owned, even after the most solemn Manner, such and such Opinions. When any of your Thoughts can skreen themselves behind a Sentence taken indeed from these Authors, but scandalously detach'd from the Thread of the Discourse, then they are the judicious, the excellent, the incomparable; but if they offer to exceed the Bounds which you prescribe, or if a Believer takes but two Words from them in the Defence of Christianity, they are immediately transform'd into Men of no Credit, in your unfortunate Dialect downright mercenary Evidence, who, rather than starve, will swear thro' any thing.

To whatever Views your Intentions might be confined in these infamous Reflections, I know not; but my Lord of London, I am persuaded, will think it no small Happiness to be added to the

\* Addr. p. 57, 58.

Number of *these holy Champions*, who have gone before him in the Profession and Defence of the *Gospel*, and are now join'd with him in their Sufferings for the *Name of Christ*. For it is too too visible, that *Christ himself* is the real Object of your Hatred, when *all* his Defenders are, *without Distinction*, involved in the *same Malignity of Reproach*.

I am now come to the seventh and last *general Head*, which his *Lordship* thus introduces. \* “The Excellence of the Christian Institution, joined to the Evidences of its Divine Authority, as set forth in my former Letter, naturally leads,”

VII. *To the great Sinfulness and Danger of rejecting it; or, in other Words, to the great Guilt and Perverseness of INFIDELITY.*

Rather than not object, we must again hear what has been already so often heard. † *He*, (the Bishop) you say, *concludes* this Pastoral Letter with saying that || “The Evidences of the Christian Religion are comprised under two general Heads, external and internal.” *And among the internal he reckons*, “the Excellence of the Doctrines contained in it,” and “the visible Tendency of the whole to the Improvement and Perfection of human Nature, and the Happiness of Mankind in this World and the next.” To this you propose your old worn-out Question; *Does not this Character exclude every thing which is not fit, expedient, wise, and reasonable?* Since I find Repetition pleases you, take the old Answer, Yes; it does most certainly; and from hence you may justly infer, what his *Lordship's Judgment* is in the present Case, *viz.* That there is nothing with-

\* Past. Lett. p. 78.    † Addr. p. 54.    || Past. Lett. p. 80.  
in

in the whole compass of Christianity, that is either unfit, in-expedient, unwise, or unreasonable. And of this you, and yours, are at Liberty to make the best Advantage you can.

I have now gone thro', as I think, every Passage in this *Pastoral Letter*, which you have any ways made the Subject of Civil or Objection; and not only vindicated them from your Abuses, but where the Nature of the thing debated seem'd to require it, I have endeavoured to pursue the Subject to greater Length, not as thinking myself capable of adding any thing to what his *Lordship* has given us in its mature Perfection, but as knowing the Use it sometimes is to set the same Thought in a different Light; as also to manifest the real Strength of a *Maxim* or *Principle*, by making regular *Deductions* from it. And, in order to let the Reader see at once that wild, confused, and desultory Manner of Opposition, with which you have declaimed against this *Pastoral Letter*, the Arguments whereof, I have gone thro' regularly Page after Page, I shall set down the Number and Order of your Pages, as I have been obliged to refer to them for your Objections, viz.

*Addr.* p. 2, 3. 48, 49, 50. 55. 71. 74. 67. 93. 6, 7. 98. 95. 94. 23. 38. 100. 96, 97. 78. 5. 76. 10, 11. 13. 54, 55. 82, 83. 57, 58. 54. 101.

For the Fulness and Fairness of my Quotations on both Sides, I appeal to any one who has seen the *Pastoral Letter* and the *Address*; on the Perusal of which, any one must see, that you either muster up from some *Common Place*, especially *Christianity as old as the Creation*, (of which, indeed, this *Address* is little else than an artful *Retail*) old baffled Arguments, perfect *Invalids*, and long past Service; or, make your Attacks with Forces more peculiar to your own Genius, accu-

mulative Sophistry, set at a greater Distance from Discovery, under the Form of Questions, gross Misrepresentations of the Authors you quote, continued Abuse of those you write against; and from all these put together, very loud, and if any one will take your Word, very clear Conclusions on your Side of the Question.

There is one Quotation of yours behind, whose notorious Falshood I must shew, before we part; it is what you chuse to *triumph* in, at the Close of the Body of your *Address*, just before your *Epilogue*; viz. “*Themistius* the Philosopher, speaking of the Bishops of his own Time, gives this Character of them; *That they are a sort of Men who do not worship God, but the Purple*\*. Here even your own Front a little fail’d you, and so we are referr’d to a wrong Place for the Truth of this Imputation, viz. *Socr. Eccl. Hist. l. 4 c. 32.* where indeed *Themistius* is mention’d, but on an Account very different from yours, viz. † “For telling the Emperor *Valens*, in an Oration made to him, that he should not wonder at the Disagreement of *Christian* Doctrines, for their Disagreement was small, in Comparison of the Multitude, and Confusion of the Doctrines, which were among the *Heathens*, where their Number was above three Hundred.”

Here I must observe, that since Variety of *Practices* does necessarily follow Variety of *Opinions*; and since *Actions* as well as *Tenets* are true and just from their *Conformity* to the Nature of Things, which is but one, and *invariable*, it must

\* Addr. p. 101.

† Μὴ δέντε ξενίζεσθε ὅπερ τῇ Διαφωνίᾳ τῆς Χριστιανικῶν θρημάτων μηχανὴ γέγονε περὶ αὐτῶν Διαφωνίας, ὡς τοῦτο πελλέθεται καὶ ποιητικὸν τὸ παρόν. "Ελληνος θρημάτων. Εἴδος γένος τῆς στιλανόστια θρημάτων. Socr. Eccl. Hist. l. iv. c. 32. per Val. fol-

follow, that where the Variety of Opinions is greatest, there evil Practices or Actions *contrary to Truth* will be most *numerous*. So that this Philosopher, who was himself a *Pagan*, does implicitly confess, that the Lives of his own Heathens were more immoral than those of the *Christians*. But,

I suppose you took your Hint from l.3.c.25. where the *Historian* says, \* “that the Emperor (*Jovian*, “ who succeeded the *Apostate*) resolved to cut off “ the ambitious Struggles of those who disagreed, “ by Civility and Persuasion; declaring he would “ not be troublesome to *any one* of what *Persua-* “ *sion* *soever*.—And that he did thus, the Phi- “ losopher *Themistius* affirms: For speaking a *Con-* “ *sular* Oration to him, he admires the *Emperor*, “ as superseding the Addresses of Flattery, by al- “ lowing *every one* to worship as they pleased; and “ pulling these Flatterers a little to Pieces, he “ says, that they were very ridiculously found to “ worship the *Purple*, not *God*; and that they “ differed nothing from *Euripus*, now throwing “ their Waves this way, now the contrary.”

Now the Declaration here mentioned, was for an *universal Toleration* of all *Sects*, of the *Heathens* as well as *Christians*; and as such, *Themistius*, who was a *Heathen*, had the *Benefit* of it; on which account, in his *Consular Oration* to *Jovian*, he speaks thus, in the Person of the *whole Roman*

\* Ο μέντοι βασιλεύς τρέψειν εῖχε, κολακεία γῇ πειθῶι τῷ διεσώτων τὸ φιλονεκίου ἐκκόται· φῆται μηδὲν ὄχλορες τῶν ὑπωσθν τε διέντων ἔστεγο. — Τάυτα δὲ εἴ τις αὐτὸν φράξῃ καὶ ΘεμίσιΘεος τὸν διάστημα τὸ φιλόσοφοθ. Ταπικὸν γάρ λόγον εἰς αὐτὸν διελθὼν, θαυμάζει τὸ βασιλέα, ὡς τὸ ἔρεντα δρυπικίεν τὸς ἔχεσσος βέλοντα, νικήταντα τὸ κολάκιον ποὺ βότης. “Οὐ καὶ διασύρων, πάντα γελοῖας, ἔση, εἰλέγοντας αἱ τοῦ ἀλεργίου, καὶ Θεῖον, διεργάζοντας: μηδὲν τε διαφέρειν αὐτὸν Ἐυρίπε, &c.

Socr. Eccl. Hist. l. iii. c. 25. per Valei.

Empire, both *Christian* and *Heathen*: \* “Without this Toleration, we are very ridiculously found to be Worshippers of the Purple, not of God, and to change *our* Religion easier than the Tides of *Euripus*. Heretofore there was but one *Theramenes*, now every one is ready for every Side.” — The same Persons frequent the Altars, the Sacrifices, the Images, and the Tables.” — What therefore this *Heathen* Orator speaks of in a complimentary Strain, as *universal*, that your great Good-will to *Christianity* would have true of the Bishops only. If you cannot love Truth, I beg, Mr. *Addressee*, you would fear Detection. *Themistius* has the same Thought expressed in the same way in his Oration to *Valens*, which being preserved in the *Latin* of *Duditius*, I refer you thither for more Certainty.

I have now little more to do, than to acknowledge my Obligations to you, as one Occasion of my considering with more than ordinary Attention, both the *external* and the *internal* Evidences of our most *holy Religion*, set before us in a Series of Arguments as strong and conclusive as the Nature of Truth itself requires, and in a Method more easy and familiar than the World has ever yet been acquainted with: For until we know † what is sweeter than *Honey*, or what is stronger than a *Lion*, we shall never be informed what is more persuasive than his *Lordship's* Advice to his People, or more forcible than the Reasoning of his *Pastoral Letters*, which must abide in Honour, as

\* Ἐλεγχόμενα πάντα χροίως αἰλυρύῖδας, & Θεῖδν, Στρατόποντες, καὶ ὅφοι Ἐυρίπῳ μεταβεβλόμενοι τὰς ἀγκείας. Καὶ πάλαι μὲν ἐς Θηρευέντας, τὸν δὲ στρατὸν κόδωνοι. Οἰδὺτοις τῷδες βαροῖσι, τῷδες ἱεροῖσι, τῷδες αἰγάλμασι, τῷδες βαπτέασι. *Themist. Orat. per Harduin. p. 67, 68.*

† *Judg. xiv. 18.*

long

long as the Name of *Christianity* remains among us.

I must also humbly beg his *Lordship's* Pardon for pursuing this Controversy with Endeavours so unequal to the Subject, and his superior manner of treating it; and at the same time declare my Wishes that his *Lordship* may late receive that *Recompense of Reward* which is laid up for all those who persevere in the Defence of *Christ*, and in suffering for the *revealed Will of God*, *which is the Pillar and Ground of Truth*.

And indeed for what possible Reasons should *Christianity* be rejected, even in regard to the Life that now is? Can the Methods of *Government*, the Interest of *Nations*, the Happiness of *Prince* or *People*, be promoted by it? Or can *Paganism* give us greater Light into relative and social Duties, or more Encouragement to the Practice of them? No; this is not pretended; but the Credit of *human Reason*, the Cause of *Truth*, even the Honour of *God himself* is at Stake. If *Christianity* is true as a Religion revealed by *God*, then *God* has dealt with *some Men* more favourably than with *others*; but this is inconsistent with the Character of impartial, universal, and infinite *Benevolence*, and the essential Nature of *Things*. In order therefore to remove this Cause of Error, which seems to be a fundamental one, in all your Writings, I shall observe, by way of Conclusion, that,

All the Actions of *God* are so far governed by Reasons precisely taken from the essential Nature of *Things*, and *Relations* thence arising, that no distinct Species of Being, or Individual, can receive any other Treatment in the way of *Justice*, than what follows necessarily his or their essential Natures and Relations. This is a Law, which,

as

as you understand it, must be considered in the way of Argument as *prior*, and in Fact *superior* to God. We may be therefore fully assured, that *all* Mankind have, in *all* Ages, been treated by God according to the Dictates of *this* original Rule, since it is what he *cannot* depart from. None therefore of the most *ignorant*, *barbarous*, and to *our* Apprehensions, the most *forsaken*, can have any Reason to complain of *Injustice*, or that God has not used them, as their *essential* Nature, *Human Nature*, required; for that is impossible; and he is *justly* dealt with, who has his *own*. God cannot deviate from this establish'd Principle.

The remaining Question in general, is, Whether God is so *confined*, *chained*, and *fettered* by any necessitating *Bondage* of this Rule, as not to be *able* to treat Mankind, or any other Species of the Creation *better*, or *more favourably* than their *essential* Natures do require. In particular, whether God may not give to any Body of Men, more enlarged Knowledge both of *his* Nature and *their* own? may not prescribe *stricter* Measures of Duty, propose *higher* Principles of Action, and *stronger* Motives to Obedience, &c. than what are, or have been, discoverable among Men since the loss of *Paradise*? And, Whether he *may* not offer this System of religious Truths to their Reception, by such Evidences as the Nature of a *Divine Revelation* (if supposed) would either require or admit? And all this, with a strict Injunction to those who are made Partakers of those Blessings, to endeavour the *Propagation* of them among other Men and Nations, as far as their several Abilities will extend? This, I say, is the only remaining Matter of Dispute: And for any one to assert the Truth of the former Position, and at the same time deny the Question thus stated,

ted, What is it, but to affirm, That God must be just by a superior Necessity; but, that he cannot be good or gracious by any Choice or Election of his own?

To say that this would make God a *partial* Being, is nothing but to wrap up Confusion in the *Obscurity* of a Word. For Partiality, as it is a *blameable* Affection of the Mind, must consist in the *unequal* Distribution of those Things to which Men have an *equal Claim*; and that *Claim* precisely founded in the *strict* Considerations of *Right* and *Justice*.—If then it be a *self-evident* Principle, that it is lawful for *me* to do what I will with *my own*, the Conclusion is as evident, THAT our Eyes ought not to be EVIL, because the Eye of our Almighty Father is infinitely GOOD.

## F I N I S.



P. 30. *Leg. impietatum*; P. 34. *εἰμαρ* — P. 45. *materiam*;  
P. 53. *ωατερ*; P. 54. *πνευματικόν*.



